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As gambling sites proliferate on the Internet and telephone gambling
is legalized in more states, an increasingly large fraction of the public
can place a bet without ever leaving home at all. Universally available,
“round-the-clock” gambling may soon be a reality…. [T]he country has
gone very far very fast regarding an activity the consequences of which,
frankly, no one really knows much about.1
I. INTRODUCTION
{1} It is estimated that 2003 global revenues for Internet gambling2 will approach $4.2 billion,3 while
Internet gaming market growth for 2002-2003 was pegged at twenty percent.4 The majority of online
gamblers in 2002 were American5 and fifty-four governments around the world currently sanction
some form of Internet gaming.6 In the United States, however, state governments have, without
exception, currently chosen to forbid most Internet gambling.7 Although state law enforcement agents
have had some successes in confronting this formidable off-shore business,8 states are seeking the
assistance of the federal government in order to regain control over the gaming activities that take
place within their borders. In response, Congress has not hesitated to propose a battery of Internet
gambling legislation.
{2} A common criticism of federal Internet gambling bills is that the bills seemingly represent a power
grab by the federal government in the realm of gambling – a domain traditionally regulated by the
states.9 The purpose of this paper is not only to examine whether further federal intervention in the
realm of Internet gambling would be consistent with past federal gaming policy, but also to address the
specific aspects of past and present Congressional bills that are most promising in tackling non-tribal
Internet gambling.10
{3} The first step in this analysis is to recognize that Internet gambling did not arise in a legal vacuum.
On the contrary, federal gambling policy has a long and complicated history. Consequently, instead of
devising novel legal frameworks for online gaming, Part II of this paper considers Congress’s historical
approach towards gambling and discerns a few trends in federal gaming policy. Part III explores the
risks of online gaming using the example of Internet casinos and concludes that these risks need not
necessarily be greater than those presented by offline gaming. The underlying federal policy towards
online gaming should not, therefore, dramatically differ from the federal policy underlying offline
gaming. Part IV, however, will demonstrate that the federal approaches to online and offline gaming
are not, in practice, consistent. Consequently, reforms are necessary to bring current legislation and
enforcement methods up to date with online gaming’s possibilities. A series of reforms that have been
presented in Congressional Internet gambling bills will be evaluated in Part V, using criteria such as
consistency with past federal gambling policy, efficacy, and precedents for Internet regulation. This
paper concludes that Congress should target financial institutions associated with unlawful gambling in
order to reinforce state gambling policies; however, federal law should be modified in order to permit
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wagers to and from jurisdictions in which the gambling at issue is legal. As in the past, states should
remain the principle arbiters of gambling policy.
{4} This paper presents no conclusions as to whether online gaming is “good” or “bad.” Gambling,
in general, and online gaming, in particular, can be approached from a variety of angles. There are
economic, sociological and moral arguments that have been marshaled by proponents and opponents
alike of various forms of gambling.11 These arguments, however, are not emphasized, because they are
rarely unique to Internet gambling. As Part III will demonstrate, Internet gaming is largely a variation
on gambling rather than a new species of it. The heart of the analysis rests on the assumption that it is
the underlying acts of gambling that should or should not be punished, rather than the medium through
which these acts are accomplished.
II. THE FEDERAL APPROACH TOWARDS GAMBLING
{5} Gambling regulation is generally recognized as a state, rather than a federal, responsibility
pursuant to the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.12 As one recently proposed piece
of Congressional Internet gambling legislation noted:
Since the founding of our country, the Federal Government has left gambling regulation
to the States. The last two Federal commissions Congress created to look into gambling
have concluded that States are best equipped to regulate gambling within their own
borders, and recommended that Congress continue to defer to the States in this respect.
The Federal Government has largely deferred to the authority of States to determine the
type and amount of gambling permitted.13
Generally, there is a perception that gambling issues are best addressed at the local level,14 and all
fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted some form of gaming regulation, ranging from
Nevada’s liberal policy to Utah and Hawaii’s bans.15
{6} In some situations in the past, federal legislation has addressed gambling in order to assist states
with the enforcement of their own gambling legislation. For example, the regulation of lotteries
entailed some of the first federal regulatory forays into gambling. Although critics in the nineteenth
century argued that lottery bans were not enforceable16 (a criticism reminiscent of those leveled at
Internet gambling regulations),17 only Missouri and Kentucky had not prohibited lotteries by 1862.18
However, out-of-state lottery operators avoided state regulations by sending tickets to state residents
through the mail. The states, not able to regulate the postal system or to prosecute these out-of-state
operators, could not effectively enforce their own anti-lottery policies.19 Such concerns prompted
Congress, using its postal authority, to enact anti-lottery acts that banned sending lottery-related
circulars20 and newspapers containing advertisements for lotteries through the mail.21 When one
infamous lottery22 subsequently moved its operations to Honduras in an effort to avoid state and federal
anti-lottery regulations, Congress again supported state anti-lottery policy in 1895 by passing the
Federal Anti-Lottery Act,23 which limited the importation and interstate carriage of materials associated
with gambling.24
{7} This deference to and support of state gambling policy is also evident in more recent Congressional
gambling-related legislation. For example, Section 320905 of the Public Code, which was part of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,25 updated the modern incarnation of
the aforementioned Federal Anti-Lottery Act26 in order “to protect the sovereignty of State lottery
programs” by accounting for “advances in communication technology” and thus “preserving a State’s
right to sell its own lottery tickets within its borders and exclude the sale of other States’ tickets.”27
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Moving beyond lotteries, the Illegal Gambling Businesses Act, which was enacted as part of the 1970
Crime Control Act, prohibited an “illegal gambling business,” defined as a gambling business that is
in “violation of the law of a State . . . in which it is conducted.”28 By making this statute dependant
upon state law, Congress allowed states to determine whether to permit or to prohibit certain forms
of gambling, while providing federal support for those who opted for the latter.29 18 U.S.C. § 1511,
which was also enacted as part of the 1970 Crime Control Act, states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for
two or more persons to conspire to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal laws of a State or political
subdivision thereof, with the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business.”30 It, too, was designed
to assist states in the enforcement of their gambling laws by avoiding situations where corrupt local
officials hamper enforcement.31
{8} Lest one think that the federal government, rather than deferring to state gambling policy, has
merely used state enforcement weaknesses to push a federal anti-gambling policy, it is informative
to examine the federal response when anti-lottery sentiment diminished in the 1960’s and 1970’s and
several states began to authorize lotteries.32 This more favorable approach towards lotteries conflicted
with the federal anti-lottery legislation that had once supported practically uniform state policies
against lotteries. The gap between some states’ support of lotteries and federal anti-lottery legislation
even led the Department of Justice in 1974 to warn certain states’ governors that their states may have
violated criminal provisions of federal law.33 Congress avoided a federal-state collision by enacting
18 U.S.C. § 1307, an exception to federal law for state-operated lotteries that allowed the latter to
use the mail and certain radio and television broadcasts for lottery promotions. Congress thereby
accommodated the pro-lottery policy of certain states while it continued to use its federal powers to
limit lottery promotions falling outside of the narrow exception, thus supporting the policy of nonlottery states.34
{9} A Congressional commission that studied America’s national approach towards gambling in 1976
offered the following statement of how the federal government should approach gambling policy:
“[T]he States should have the primary responsibility for determining what forms of gambling may
legally take place within their borders. The Federal government should prevent interference by one
State with the gambling policies of another, and should act to protect identifiable national interests.”35
However, the “identifiable national interests” cited therein might provide the exception that swallows
the rule. In particular, there is a tension between federal deference to, and support of, state gambling
policies and a perception of gambling as a breeding ground for organized crime and therefore a
legitimate target of federal action. Crime syndicates, which prospered during Prohibition, used illegal
gambling as a source of wealth and continued to do so well after Prohibition’s repeal.36 In 1950, the
Special Senate Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce emphasized the
link between crime and gambling in a series of sensational hearings,37 and this association has been
put forth to justify numerous Congressional pieces of legislation.
{10} The Johnson Act,38 which regulated the interstate transport of certain gambling devices and
required federal registration for gambling device manufacturers and dealers, sought to assist local
law enforcement agents in combating “[n]ation-wide crime syndicates.”39 In addition, the Wire Act,
prohibiting the interstate transmission of wagers, the Travel Act, prohibiting interstate and foreign
“travel [or transportation] in aid of racketeering enterprises,” and the Wagering Paraphernalia Act,
regulating interstate transportation of various gambling-related devices, were all subsequently
enacted in 1961 as part of Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s war on organized crime.40 The
Wagering Paraphernalia Act was designed “to provide means for the Federal Government to combat
interstate crime and to assist the States in the enforcement of their criminal laws . . .,”41 while the
Travel Act sought “to bring about a serious disruption in the far-flung organization and management
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of coordinated criminal enterprises.”42 The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, enacted during
President Nixon’s campaign against crime, followed the trend of legislation combating organized crime
by targeting “illegal gambling businesses” regardless of whether there was an explicit connection with
interstate commerce.43 The following year, the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Statute (RICO), which was designed to combat “the infiltration of organized crime [and racketeering]
into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce,”44 included gambling violations as
predicate acts for RICO prosecutions.
{11} In a system in which some states have prohibited one form of gambling while others have
not, federal gambling regulations will not be completely neutral. Preventing “interference by one
State with the gambling policies of another” has often meant protecting the anti-gambling policies of
one state against the more favorable gambling policies of another state.45 For example, the United
States Supreme Court applied the Wagering Paraphernalia Act to prohibit the transportation of New
Hampshire sweepstake receipts into New York, where such sweepstakes where then illegal.46 If carried
to an extreme, this approach might justify frequent federal intervention in a wide-range of gambling
activities. However, the federal government has, perhaps for pragmatic reasons and out of respect
for a traditional federal-state balance, generally settled for policies that limit the size and reach of
widespread gambling operations. The Eleventh Circuit noted in United States v. Farris with respect
to the Travel Act that Congress has adopted the viewpoint that “large-scale gambling is dangerous
to federal interests wherever it occurs.”47 Although that quotation might seem to be in tension with
traditional federal deference to state gambling policy, a House Judiciary Committee Report on the
Illegal Gambling Business Act stated that the legislation’s intent:
is not to bring all illegal gambling activity within the control of the Federal
Government, but to deal only with illegal gambling activities of major
proportions . . . . It is intended to reach only those persons who prey
systematically upon our citizens and whose syndicated operations are so
continuous and so substantial as to be of national concern.48
An emphasis on targeting “large-scale” operations has been echoed by Kevin DiGregory, the Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, in his Congressional testimony that “federal resources should be spent
targeting large gambling operations -- and any organized crime involvement or fraud connected with
such activities -- and other more serious offenses.” 49 Elsewhere, DiGregory has observed, with respect
to Internet gambling prosecutions, “a combination of lack of resources and priorities within certain
Federal districts and within the Justice Department. We have only so many resources and so many
prosecutors to spread around.”50
{12} In addition to resource limitations on the federal government’s ability to prosecute gambling,51
there are other policy-oriented reasons for limiting federal involvement. G. Robert Blakey and Harold
Kurland have written, “[t]he national policy toward gambling rests heavily on principles of federalism52
. . . . [T]he federal criminal statutes define narrow parameters of permissible activity, but afford the
states sufficient flexibility to experiment.”53 Thus, even if Congress may, under the Constitution, have
the power to prohibit large areas of gambling activities, it has adopted a more conservative approach
towards the regulation of gambling operations. The strands of federal gambling policy might be
characterized as deference to state gaming policy, support of this policy, and the targeting of large-scale
gaming operations in the interest of fighting crime.54
III. REGULATED ONLINE GAMING: A VARIATION ON A THEME
{13} Professor Larry Lessig has written, with respect to the Internet, that “the nature of the Net is set
in part by its architectures, and that the possible architectures of cyberspace are many.”55 One might
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similarly say with respect to Internet gaming that its possible architectures are also many. Yet, one
frequently encountered problem in the debate surrounding online gaming legislation is that distinctions
between online and offline gambling are drawn based upon comparisons between regulated forms
of offline gambling and unregulated forms of online gambling. For example, unregulated Internet
casinos might be compared to heavily regulated brick and mortar casinos, and the former are
unsurprisingly found to be less safe from any number of angles. However, the appropriate comparison
is between unregulated online casinos and unregulated offline casinos or between regulated online
casinos and regulated brick and mortar casinos.
{14} Having highlighted some federal trends towards gambling in Part II, Part III questions whether
these trends should be applied to Internet gaming. In order to make this determination, one must
decide whether Internet gaming is a unique and inherently dangerous form of gambling warranting
a novel legislative framework. If it is not, then there is little reason to deviate from the principles
outlined in Part II for the sake of online gaming. The following section uses the example of Internet
casinos to demonstrate that frequently-cited problems with Internet gambling, including (1) fraud,
(2) money-laundering, (3) pathological gambling, and (4) underage gambling,56 are not necessarily
inherent to Internet gambling operations. In particular, regulations similar to those imposed on offline
casinos or devised specifically for the technological medium may limit Internet gambling’s risks.57
{15} The example of Internet casinos was chosen because this form of online gaming arguably
presents the greatest differences with offline gaming. Whereas online sports betting is not inherently
different with respect to the underlying gambling activity or gambling environment than, for example,
sports betting over a telephone, Internet casinos have brought to the living room an activity once
confined to entertainment palaces.58 Therefore, if it can be shown that the differences between online
and offline Internet casinos are not sufficient to warrant novel gambling policy, then it might follow
under a “greater includes the lesser” rationale that the fewer differences between other forms of online
and offline gambling are even less adequate. Thus, the implication of Part III is that the differences
between online and offline gaming, in general, are not sufficient to warrant departures from the federal
government’s traditional approach towards gaming regulation. While online gaming poses certain
possibilities and dangers, these possibilities and dangers differ in degree rather than in kind from those
presented by offline gaming.59
A. Fraud
{16} Unregulated gambling “affords no protection to customers and no assurance of fairness or
honesty in the operation of the gambling devices.”60 This concern about fraud is not unique to Internet
casinos, but gaming commissions generally oversee offline casinos in the U.S. in order to ensure a fair
treatment of gamblers.61 Integrity concerns about online gambling include Internet casino operators
running off with deposits, refusing to pay winnings or misusing a client’s private information.62 In
addition, it is extremely difficult for a gambler to verify whether the stated odds on a virtual game are
accurate.63 An Internet casino could easily misrepresent these odds in order to make them seem more
favorable to the gambler.
{17} The ways of preventing fraud in Internet casinos are not very different from the ways in
which fraud is limited in land-based casinos.64 These processes include licensing, inspections and
accounting for revenues. For example, under a proposed Australian regulatory framework, each State
and Territory, among other requirements, would have to approve the “financial soundness, technical
expertise and operational ability” of the operator, the licensing of “key personnel,” and incomedistribution arrangements.65 In Nevada, only licensed land-based casinos of a certain size would be
able to operate online casinos.66 Licensing of Internet casinos might also include an examination of
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the site’s software.67 In order to obtain a license from the Northern Territory of Australia, Lasseters
Online, an Internet casino launched in 1998, was required to pass a series of hurdles, including
approval of computer and control systems,68 licensing of key employees, financial controls that
included keeping transaction records for seven years,69 player protection measures, and a prohibition
on payments to a customer unless the player’s identity, age, and place of residence have been verified.70
Fines for each violation are generally AUD $2,000.
{18} In short, there is little reason to believe that a state gaming commission’s regulation of its state’s
online casinos could not control fraud to the same extent as offline casinos. Furthermore, while
licensing imposes costs upon Internet casinos, a government license may also provide a competitive
advantage. One survey reported that sixty percent of Americans believed that offshore Internet casinos
were fixed, and this concern about fraud is likely to have negative economic consequences for the
Internet casino industry.71 Licensing may translate into a more reputable image for certain Internet
casinos and better business.72
B. Money-Laundering
{19} Money-laundering is a process during which the origins of illegally-derived proceeds are
concealed and attributed to legitimate sources.73 This process can be broken down into three stages:
placement, layering, and integration.74 During the first stage, the illicitly-derived funds are either
deposited in a financial institution or converted to other monetary instruments.75 This placement stage
is the first point of entry of the funds into a legitimate financial stream.76 Since a sudden, significant
amount of value may attract the attention of law enforcement agents, layering, the next stage, often
involves breaking up and transferring these funds to different accounts and institutions in order to
obscure the funds’ origins. In order for layering to be successful, the criminal may take advantage
of legislative loopholes or poor coordination between police forces across jurisdictions.77 The
“integration” stage, during which the funds are used to purchase legitimate assets or to fund further
activities, completes the money-laundering process.78
{20} Unregulated Internet casinos may pose several money-laundering risks, particularly at the
layering stage.79 The speed, international character, and possible anonymity of certain Internet
gambling transactions, together with the potential of transferring large sums of money, may attract
money launderers to online gambling operations.80 In addition, some Internet casinos “offer a broad
array of financial services to their customers, such as providing credit accounts, fund transmittal
services, check cashing services, and currency exchange services.”81 A possible laundering of money
could take the following form:
A person in Australia could . . . deposit the proceeds of a drug sale onto his/her credit
card, and then transfer the amount via the card to an online casino in a ‘tax haven.’ The
casino opens an account for the person and the account is credited with the amount
deposited. The person gambles some of the money and the winnings (or losses) are
credited (or debited) to the account. When the person wishes to withdraw the money
from the account the casino sends the funds back to the person’s credit card as winnings.
The . . . money is now clean.82
Since law enforcement authorities must be able to monitor or review a business’s transactions in order
to detect and prosecute money-laundering,83 and since the records of offshore gambling operators
may be difficult for regulatory authorities in another jurisdiction to obtain, law enforcement agents in
another jurisdiction would have no means of verifying the suspected money-launderer’s claims.84
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{21} A money-launderer may not even have to place a bet in order to clean his funds. Depending on
the Internet casino, the criminal might be able to place his money in a casino account and then move
the funds into another account as “winnings” without ever playing a game.85 While this example
could work with an Internet gambling site that was oblivious to its client’s money-laundering activity,
money-launderers may also try to operate their own Internet casinos. In such a case, the criminal
would transfer his funds to the site which would then deduct a small amount of money (a money
laundering “fee”) and attribute the deduction to a “gaming loss.” Without having placed a wager, the
money-launderer, with the assistance of the Internet casino, would have been able to cloak the origin
of the illegitimate funds.86
{22} A further money-laundering risk, while not unique to Internet gambling operations,87 could be
exacerbated by government regulations directed towards Internet gambling. Proposed legislation
in the U.S. that targets payment methods for Internet casinos may push customers towards more
anonymous payment mechanisms.88 And while credit cards leave transaction records,89 electronic
money need not. Electronic money “is a money replacement based on encryption technologies which
disguise the electronic information so that only the intended recipient can access its meaning.”90
The strength of the encryption technology (and therefore the anonymity of its user) may vary, with
the potential to be so strong that the e-money provider cannot track its own customers’ use of the
electronic currency.91 The money-laundering applications of anonymous electronic cash are manifold.
Since anonymous electronic money can bypass traditional financial institutions, placement would
become easier as criminals avoided the financial transaction reporting systems used by governmental
authorities to trace funds.92 Furthermore, anonymous electronic money would make it easier to send
large monetary sums to poorly regulated countries and then back into the criminal’s jurisdiction,
thereby facilitating the integration stage of money laundering.93 While the threat posed by certain
forms of electronic money exists independently of Internet casinos, government regulation that targets
traditional payment methods threatens to create a larger market for an attractive money-laundering
tool.94
{23} However, electronic money also has its drawbacks. First, transfer fees for some forms of
electronic money run as a high as thirty percent of the amount sent.95 Second, the lack of a clear
market leader among the various forms of electronic money means that players may not be able to
use the same form of electronic money provider with whom they have registered at multiple gaming
sites.96 Third, consumers seem to lack confidence in this complex technology.97
{24} These drawbacks may be overcome in time; however, the dangers posed by certain forms
of electronic money are not an argument against Internet gaming.98 The dangers are, instead, an
argument in favor of implementing a national or international approach to address the dangers posed
by electronic money’s anonymity.99 While federal legislation targeting illegal Internet gaming
operations might limit some forms of money laundering, local Internet gaming regulators may also
contribute to limiting money laundering. Since money-laundering thrives on poor regulatory oversight
and anonymity, a well-regulated environment with extensive record-keeping acts as a deterrent to
potential money-launderers. Player registration, investigations of gaming operators and employees,
and transaction records chip away at the anonymity of online casino activity. In addition, deposit
and payout rules may further discourage money laundering. Specific provisions at Lasseters Online
include:
•

ID verification procedures are used.100

•

Records are maintained for when a player enters and leaves the online casino and for what
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games were played and how much was wagered, won or lost.101 All account details, including
deposits and withdrawals, are also preserved.102
•

A gambler’s monthly deposit is initially capped at $500 when using credit cards. Once the
client has provided pieces of age and residence-verifying identification, the default monthly
maximum is raised to $2,500.103

•

Credit cards can only be used to deposit funds to a player’s account. Lasseters confirms, in real
time, whether the cards have been reported stolen and whether sufficient funds are available.104

•

Winnings are paid out in the form of checks written out to the individual whose identity and
address have been previously verified.105

{25} In addition, those efforts currently used to address money laundering at brick and mortar gaming
operations might be applied to U.S.-based Internet gaming operations.106 For example, the Bank
Secrecy Act,107 which was enacted in 1970 to combat money laundering, was extended to include
casinos in 1985108 and strengthened through subsequent legislation.109 This framework has imposed
detailed reporting requirements on currency transactions involving a single individual of more than
$10,000 and has also criminalized efforts to avoid these reporting requirements.110 Reforming this and
related legislation to apply to Internet gaming operators111 would help to create the audit trails useful to
law enforcement agents in tracking money launderers.112 The appropriate regulations promise to make
Internet casinos at least as unappealing to money launderers as their brick and mortar counterparts.
C. Pathological Gambling
{26} The Diagnostic and Statistics Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV) classifies “pathological
gambling” as an impulse control disorder.113 One who presents this disorder exhibits five or more of
the following ten factors. He/she:
(1) is preoccupied with gambling . . . ,
(2) needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired
excitement,
(3) has repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling,
(4) is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling,
(5) gambles as a way of escaping from problems or of relieving a dysphoric mood . . . ,
(6) after losing money gambling, often returns another day to get even . . . ,
(7) lies to family members, therapist, or others to conceal the extent of involvement
with gambling,
(8) has committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement to finance
gambling,
(9) has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or career
opportunity because of gambling, [or]
(10) relies on others to provide money to relieve a desperate financial situation caused
by gambling . . . .114
{27} In the United States, the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences has
estimated that 1.5% of adults have met the criteria for “pathological gambling” at some point in their
lives, and 0.9 percent of the adult population has met these criteria within the past year.115 Australia’s
Productivity Commission similarly noted that 1% of its population had “severe” gambling problems116
(the Productivity Commission opted not to use the DSM-IV nomenclature) that included a combination
of depression, serious suicidal thoughts, divorce, debt and poverty, and crime.117 Pathological
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gambling is exhibited proportionately more often among young, poor, and less educated individuals,118
although “there are few clear individual factors, other than age, that are associated with a higher
likelihood of gambling problems.”119
{28} Unregulated Internet gaming operations may pose greater risks for pathological gambling
than their brick and mortar counterparts. In particular, twenty-four hour access, the rapid pace of
Internet games, enhanced privacy (and the possibly concomitant diminishment of social constraints),
lower outlays on Internet games due to the fewer costs involved in setting up an online casino when
compared to a land-based casino,120 and the lack of a “‘tangible representation of money’ such as
betting chips for users to visualize how much they have won or lost”121 have been posited as reasons
why Internet gambling may pose greater risks than land-based gambling for pathological gamblers. In
addition, Internet casino software may examine a player’s past pattern of gaming in order to create a
more tailored and attractive gaming experience.122 Those with gambling disorders may be particularly
attractive clients for Internet gaming sites. Among those who gamble in the U.S., around 6% exhibit
pathological or problem gambling;123 yet, according to the National Opinion Research Center, this
small percentage provides 15% of the American gambling industry’s revenues.124 In a similar fashion
in Australia, problem gamblers125 constitute 15% of gamblers, but around 33% of the Australian
gambling industry’s market.126
{29} However, a number of safeguards may be put in place in order to lessen the possible risks posed
by Internet casinos to pathological gamblers. Before discussing these safeguards, though, several
differences between Internet and brick and mortar casinos that might mitigate pathological gamblers’
problems with Internet gaming sites should be addressed. First, if Internet gaming takes place at home
where a family resides, then household members may be more able to survey the family member
than if the gambling occurred far from the domicile.127 Second, offline casinos often use a range of
techniques to encourage betting -- from providing free alcohol, to pumping pleasing scents into slot
machine pits, to the use of complex color schemes -- that would be more difficult to implement online.
128
Brick and mortar casinos are able to compile customer data, such as a client’s average bet, time
spent gambling, height, weight, hair color, and corrective eyewear information, that would likely
rival anything collected online.129 Third, the fewer costs involved in the establishment and operation
of Internet casinos, when compared to the establishment and operation of their brick and mortar
counterparts, may create better gaming odds for Internet gamblers than for land-based gamblers. This
may lead, in turn, to fewer losses and/or more wins for the same duration and amount wagered in
cyber and real space. Finally, Australia has noted that many of its problem gamblers prefer to play
in social settings, suggesting that, for these problem gamblers, Internet gambling is not a perfect
substitute for land-based casinos.130
{30} There are several possible safeguards that Internet gaming operators could adopt to minimize
the risks to pathological gamblers. At Lasseters Online, clients may set bet limits on a daily,
weekly or monthly basis and cannot subsequently raise this limit without contacting the company.131
Furthermore, credit cards with unlimited lines of credit are not accepted for opening accounts, and
Lasseters Online provides a link to a gambling problem counseling service and a self-excluding button
that a gambler may press in order to take a mandatory seven day break.132 If this feature is activated
three times, then the client is permanently excluded from the site.133 However, since a gambler’s
ability to self-diagnose is questionable, the Australian Senate Select Committee on Information
Technologies recommended that third parties be allowed to exclude gamblers.134 Under Queensland’s
Interactive Gambling (Player Protection Act) enacted in 1998, “a person who satisfies the chief
executive of a close personal interest in the welfare of the person against whom the prohibition is
sought” may obtain the exclusion of a third party from an Internet gambling website.135 Notice of the
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exclusion is sent to all parties concerned and to all Queensland-based Internet gaming operators.136
Of course, in order to be effective, an exclusion policy would have to extend across the widest
geographical region possible.
{31} In addition, although privacy guidelines would have to be set, an Internet gambling site might
use its extensive records of a gamblers’ transactions in order to identify, provide information to, and
exclude pathological gamblers.137 Other proposals by the Australian Committee included:
•

Limit the speed and length of gambling activity;

•

Enforce breaks (for example, every forty-five minutes);

•

Restrict operation hours of online gambling operators;

•

Ensure that information obtained about people’s gambling habits is not used to encourage
irresponsible gambling habits; and

•

Improve compiling of customer information, detailing the duration of gambling activity, odds
of winning and losing, and the amounts the customer has won and lost.138

{32} As the Australian Senate Select Committee on Information Technologies has noted, “[o]nline
gambling makes available controls that could in fact mitigate problem gambling. Therefore, although
it may lead to increased gambling opportunities and accessibility, it may do so without impacting on
problem gambling, as long as suitable regulatory controls are in place.”139
D. Underage Gambling
{33} Younger people are reported to have higher rates of disordered gambling than their older
counterparts,140 and the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences has estimated
that a higher percentage of teenagers than adults are pathological gamblers.141 The vulnerability
of adolescents and their risk-taking behavior are cited as possible reasons for these differences.142
While casino gambling has not traditionally been popular among adolescents, relative to other types
of gaming, such as lottery or sports pools,143 the appeal and accessibility of the Internet to youths,144
combined with the Internet’s possibility of anonymous use, may change this dynamic.
{34} However, according to Australia’s Productivity Commission, “[t]he motivation and capacity
for unsupervised and regular gambling by minors on the internet is weak.”145 The financial incentive
may be limited because if the waging is done via a parent’s credit card, then the winnings will likely
be sent via check in the name of the cardholder or credited to the card, neither of which will enrich
the underage gambler.146 If the gaming is done using a non-credit method, then the child, in order to
maintain a habit and assuming no steady winning streak, must have sufficient funds at his disposal to
feed his gambling habit. As for the liability of the parents for their child’s gambling debts, a cardholder
in the United States is only liable for $50 of the amount charged via unauthorized use of his or her
credit card.147
{35} In addition to a possibly weak financial motive for minors to engage in Internet casino gambling,
ID verification procedures, such as those described below, would limit and deter underage access to
casinos. While these methods may not be one hundred percent effective in excluding minors, neither
are the current methods by brick and mortar casinos, which are often based on physical appearance.148
Lasseters Online requires a log-on for each session, meaning that a child whose parents gamble using
the service would not be able to access the computer unless he knew the relevant log-on information
(or unless the ID and password were automatically stored in the computer). Moreover, under the
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Northern Territory’s gaming regulation, the Internet gaming licensee must provide the customer with
electronic access to filtering software that will prevent minors from accessing the Internet gaming
site.149
{36} Another argument often cited against Internet casinos is that even if children do not win or lose
any money, they will become more exposed to gaming that may lead to unhealthy gaming habits later
in life.150 This increased exposure may be due to parents who use Internet casinos at home or because
some sites offer gaming practice modules that do not require money.151 Neither of these arguments,
though, is sufficient to justify the prohibition of regulated Internet casinos. Gaming regulation may
require registration in order for clients to play practice modules; however, given that countless Internet
sites, other than Internet casinos, may offer practice versions of casino-style games, it is unlikely that
such a regulation would deter an adolescent trying to play, for example, electronic blackjack. And
as for prohibiting Internet casinos because a child may be influenced to gamble later in life since
his father or mother gambled at the home computer, it is not clear that this would influence a child
any more than his parents talking over dinner about their gambling trip to a casino or any more than
watching a father play poker with friends at home.152 Furthermore, although some parents may give
their children limited permission to gamble at Internet casinos (a privilege which would be much
more difficult to obtain in a land-based casino), “socially restrained consumption of gambling within a
family environment, even if notionally illegal, may potentially have the benefit of teaching responsible
gambling, as in the case of alcohol consumption.”153
{37} Internet gambling provides the unique combination of allowing the public to gamble from the
comfort of home, while affording the government the opportunity to limit such gambling. Due to the
lack of a demonstrated connection between adolescent exposure to parental online gambling and the
development of future gambling problems, a paternalistic and invasive policy that would limit such
gambling is not warranted.154
E. Verifying Client Information
{38} Many of the solutions mentioned above require Internet gaming operators to obtain and verify
accurate client information. Customer anonymity undermines protective measures against moneylaundering, pathological gambling, underage gambling and, more generally, the ability of states to
determine their own gambling policies. The importance of accurate identification technology was
emphasized by the Nevada Assembly when, in 2001, it enacted legislation according to which:
The [gaming] commission may not adopt regulations governing the licensing
and operation of interactive gaming until the commission first determines that …
[i]nteractive gaming systems are secure and reliable, and provide reasonable assurance
that players will be of lawful age and communicating only from jurisdictions where it is
lawful to make such communications.155
Similarly, under Australia’s Uniform Standards for the Regulation of Interactive Gaming:
All systems must incorporate a method to confirm identity, age and location of the
player which complies with the legislation in the licensing jurisdiction. This must
include:
•

players to hold an account and/or be registered by the licensed
provider;

•

in order to open an account and be registered, players will be required
to provide proof of identity, age and place of residence;
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•

licensed providers are to require the identification of players each time
a player attempts to access the site, using such methods as a personal
identification number or password and challenge questions.156

We may use, once again, Lasseters Online as an example. In order to withdraw money from a casino
account within ninety days of registration,157 Lasseters Online requires a copy (which may be a faxed
or a scanned copy) of a valid passport, drivers license, birth certificate or “Age identification card”
in order to prove that the player is not a minor.158 In addition, the company requires a “rent receipt,”
electricity, telephone, gas, water bill, “or other” document as proof of address. 159 Internet casinos
might also use third party identity, age, and residence verifiers;160 however, these verifiers’ methods
may require credit card information that will obviously not be available if the gambler does not use a
credit card.
{39} Payment methods may offer another means of providing a better indication of at least one aspect
of a customer’s identificatio, namely his physical location. For example, Finland required players of
an online national lottery to have accounts with Finnish financial institutions.161 Another possibility is
for Internet gaming operators to sell stored-value cards (or “smart cards”) at stores located within the
state (for example, at locations where lottery tickets are sold) that could be used to gamble at online,
intrastate casinos. In fact, the state may have an interest in ensuring that these cards are the only
permissible payment methods used at online casinos. If a Nevada resident wants to gamble at a casino
located within the state of Nevada, he would have to buy a card from a nearby store with a prefixed
amount of cash on it. He would then use this card to deposit funds into his Internet casino account.
While this method would not prevent a Utah resident from crossing the border to buy a Nevada
state card that he could use at his Utah residence or a Maine resident, on his vacation to Utah, from
stocking up on Nevada state cards, these cards, in combination with other sources used for proof of
identification and residence, might provide a reliable portrait of a client.
{40} As technology develops, so may the capacity to ensure the accuracy of client information.
Internet casinos may one day require digital certificates, which Larry Lessig has described as:
[E]ncrypted digital objects that make it possible for the holder of the certificate to make
credible assertions about himself . . . . Such a certificate could reside on the owner’s
machine, and as he or she tries to enter a given site, the server could automatically
check whether the person entering has the proper papers. Such certificates would
function as a kind of digital passport which, once acquired, would function invisibly
behind the screen, as it were.162
Another possible identity verification scheme, although vulnerable to a variety of circumvention
techniques, would match Internet Protocol addresses against geographical databases in an effort to
locate the physical location of IP address.163
{41} The determined and technological-savvy gambler will not be thwarted by client verification
procedures. Nor, however, is the determined sixteen-year-old person likely to be thwarted in his efforts
to illegally purchase alcohol or a pack of cigarettes. The question is not whether the currently available
verification methods for Internet gamblers would be one hundred percent effective. Rather, one should
ask whether these verification procedures will increase transaction costs for most Internet gamblers to
the point where these procedures will deter most Internet gamblers from accessing out-of-state Internet
casinos. 164 While future technology may make client identification more reliable, existing methods
seem sufficient to make Internet gambling for out-of-state residents unappealing to all but the most
determined gamblers.
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IV. CURRENT FEDERAL LAW AS APPLIED TO INTERNET GAMBLING DOES NOT CONFORM TO PAST
FEDERAL GAMBLING REGULATORY TRENDS
{42} Part II of this paper attempted to discern guidelines underlying federal treatment of gambling.
Part III then demonstrated that regulated Internet casinos need not be more dangerous than regulated
offline casinos, thereby supporting the argument that the federal trends towards gambling need
not be altered for online gaming activity. Yet, to what extent are online casinos capable of being
regulated? Much of the federal gambling legislation discussed in Part II, such as the Wire, Wagering
Paraphernalia and Travel Acts, were enacted to support state policy and therefore premised on the
assumption that effective gambling regulation sometimes surpasses the states’ abilities. To the extent,
therefore, that the federal gambling policy designed to support the states and to limit large-scale
gambling enterprises is weakened, the states’ regulatory framework also becomes less effective. The
next step is to combine Parts II and III and to inquire whether the current federal approach towards
online gaming is, in practice, consistent with the federal gambling framework.
{43} Since federal gaming policy often defers to state legislatures, one may first inquire how states
have responded to Internet gaming. As mentioned above,165 most Internet gambling is, in theory,
illegal in every state. Some states have enacted statutes explicitly targeting Internet gambling,166 while
in other states, Internet gambling may also run afoul of general gambling state statutes.167 Yet while
state attorneys general have not hesitated to pursue Internet gambling operators,168 a consensus is
emerging that expanded federal legislation is necessary to address what Connecticut’s state attorney
general has called “the sordid, despicable nature of an unregulated, faceless, nameless Internet
gambling industry.”169 The National Association of Attorney Generals, whose members include the
chief legal officers of all U.S. states, commonwealths, and territories and which is not an association
that is often characterized as a strong advocate of increased federal intervention, has called upon
the federal government to expand its regulatory powers over Internet gambling.170 Furthermore, a
Congressionally-mandated commission, noting that “it is difficult for states to adequately monitor and
regulate such gambling,” advocated a federal prohibition on Internet gambling not already authorized
in the United States.171
{44} In light of the recognition that the problems of Internet gambling may surpass states’ regulatory
abilities, one might ask whether, with respect to Internet gambling, the federal government is
fulfilling its traditional role of supporting state gambling policy and of limiting the growth of largescale gambling operations (ostensibly in order to limit crime). One particular concern is the foreign
Internet gambling operation because it represents a significant portion of current Internet gambling
transactions172 and raises jurisdictional and enforcement problems. In order to determine whether
the federal regulatory framework for Internet gambling is consistent with the trends discussed in
the previous sections, the following analysis examines how courts might assert subject matter and
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident Internet gambling operation under existing federal gambling
law and what enforcement tools are currently available.
A. Establishing Subject Matter Jurisdiction
{45} In a diversity case, a court must determine whether the law of the forum state is applicable to the
nonresident defendant in order to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.173 As noted in
Part II, there are an assortment of federal gaming laws; however, many of these laws apply imperfectly
to Internet gaming due to changes in technology. Foremost among these laws is the Wire Act.174
The Wire Act was a federal response to the increasing use of telephones and other communications
facilities by illegal bookmaking operations.175 This Act prohibits the use of:
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a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of
bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting
event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles the
recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information
assisting in the placing of bets or wagers . . . .176
The Wire Act enables federal, state, or local law enforcement agents to enjoin communications
facilities subject to the Federal Communications Commission’s jurisdiction from providing service to
those who violate the Act.177
{46} Although the Wire Act, enacted long before the explosion of the World Wide Web, is the federal
act most often applied in efforts to prosecute Internet gambling,178 ambiguity surrounds the Wire Act’s
applicability to many forms of online gaming. Most notably, the extent of the Act’s targeted gambling
activities is unclear. Although this Act focuses on “the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event
or contest,” it never defines either “sporting event” or “contest.”179 Furthermore, it is unclear whether
the adjective “sporting” is intended to modify both “event,” as well as “contest.”180 While the Wire
Act has been applied to baseball, football,181 and horse races,182 it is questionable whether it applies
to online casino games.183 Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s explanation of the Wire Act focused
almost exclusively on “sporting events,”184 probably because the possibility of running a casino via
wires was unimaginable until the recent past. Although a New York state court applied the Wire
Act to an Antigua-based Internet casino accessible to New York residents185 and although the U.S.
Department of Justice does not consider the Wire Act limited to sports-related gambling activities,186 a
federal district court in In re MasterCard International Inc.187 stated that “internet gambling on a game
of chance is not prohibited conduct under 18 U.S.C. § 1084.”188 The court’s view was that “the Wire
Act does not prohibit internet casino gambling.”189 The federal court noted the legislative history of
the Wire Act190 and the more recent Congressional efforts to amend the Wire Act to include games of
chance as support for its position.191
{47} Even if one were to accept the interpretation that the Wire Act applies to most forms of Internet
gaming, this relevance may be of limited duration as the Act is currently formulated. Integral to the
Act’s definition of “wire communication” is “wire, cable, or other like connection between the points
of origin and reception of such transmission.”192 With the advent of wireless Internet connections,
Internet gaming operators will be able to bypass “wire communication” all together.193
{48} Nonetheless, some commentators believe that, even with the advent of wireless technology, the
Wire Act may still be applicable to Internet gaming. As noted above, the statute’s definition of “wire
communication” refers to “wire, cable, or other like connection.”194 Consequently, even if the signal’s
voyage is completely wireless, the Wire Act’s reference to “other like connection” could be applied
to new technologies.195 However, it might stretch the bounds of credibility to argue that a “wire
communication facility” may include a “wireless communication facility.”
{49} Yet as long as the communication signal traverses a wire at some point on its journey from the
sender to the receiver, the Wire Act becomes applicable,196 and this process may apply to the Internet
connection, as well as to subsequent transactions. For example, in Cheyenne Sales, Ltd. v. Western
Union Financial Services Intern,197 the Wire Act was used to justify the termination of wire transfer
services from clients in the United States to an offshore gambling business. The court stated that
“state and federal courts across the country have upheld a carrier’s termination of wire service upon
notice from either a state or federal law enforcement official that a customer is using the service in
furtherance of illegal gambling operations.”198 Although Cheyenne Sales did not involve an Internet
gaming operation, it demonstrates the possible legal vulnerability of Internet gaming businesses that
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use wire-based facilities at some point in their transactions with clients.
{50} In sum, evolving technologies have lessened the Wire Act’s efficacy. While it may have
been difficult in the 1960’s to imagine a casino operating via a “wire communications facility,” and
Congress may therefore have focused on sports betting, the Internet has offered expanded gambling
opportunities. In addition, while satellite technology was not an everyday communications reality in
the 1960’s, it is today. Despite these limitations, the Wire Act can currently be used against a variety
of online sports betting sites.
{51} Complications also surround the applicability of another federal gambling law, the Interstate
Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia Act (“Paraphernalia Act”), to Internet gaming.199 The
Paraphernalia Act prohibits everyone, except for “common carriers in the usual course of business,”
from knowingly carrying or sending “in interstate or foreign commerce any record, paraphernalia,
ticket, certificate, bills, slip, token, paper, writing, or other device used, or to be used, or adapted,
devised, or designed for use in” a variety of gambling related activities.200 In World Interactive
Gaming Corp., a gambling operation’s sending of promotional materials through the United States’
mail and purchase of computers through the United States’ mail for use in its Antigua-based Internet
casino were found to violate the Paraphernalia Act.201 However, even though the Act’s purpose was
broadly characterized as “to cut off and shut off gambling supplies,”202 and even though in United
States v. Mendelsohn,203 a Ninth Circuit Court favored a broad interpretation of the word “device”204
and held that a computer disk containing a sports bookmaking program fell under the definition,205
it is unclear whether an intangible website or gaming software downloaded from a website
would qualify as an “other device” under the Paraphernalia Act.206 In Pic-A-State Pennsylvania,
Inc. v. Pennsylvania,207 a United States district court in Pennsylvania noted that the Wire and
Paraphernalia Acts were enacted on the same day, and that while the former specifically refers to wire
communications, the latter does not. The court consequently concluded that the Paraphernalia Act
applied only to tangible objects and not to computer communications.208
{52} Other federal acts, such as the Travel and Illegal Gambling Business Acts, although largely
untested in courts, may be readily applied to Internet gaming. The Travel Act was designed to
“suppress . . . unlawful local activities from which organized crime drew its sustenance.”209 The
provisions that are possibly relevant to Internet gaming sanction the use of “any facility in interstate
or foreign commerce” to conduct “any business enterprise involving gambling” that is forbidden by
state or federal laws.210 The Travel Act may therefore cover a wider range of gambling activities than
the Wire Act with its likely limitation to sports gambling.211 The Travel Act has been used to prosecute
illegal brick and mortar casinos,212 as well as betting via the telephone.213 In addition, “facility in
interstate or foreign commerce” could apply to the Internet.214 Furthermore, in World Interactive
Gaming Corp., a New York state trial court held that the Travel Act could be used against a Delaware
corporation’s Antigua-licensed casino that provided gaming opportunities via the Internet to New York
residents.215 In particular, the court noted, “[b]y hosting this [virtual] casino and exchanging betting
information with the user, an illegal communication in violation of the Wire Act and the Travel Act has
occurred.”216
{53} The Illegal Gambling Businesses Act makes it illegal to conduct any gambling business that:
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct,
or own all or part of such business; and (iii) has been or remains in substantially
continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of
$2,000 in any single day.217
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While section 1955 has yet to be successfully used to prosecute an Internet gaming operation, its
minimal requirements may make it a likely candidate for future use. Offering a website for more
than thirty days may satisfy the third requirement, and it is possible that the “five or more persons”
in the second requirement might include computer support staff.218 Furthermore, in contrast to the
other statutes, section 1955 reaches purely intrastate gambling activities.219 However, since the Illegal
Gambling Business Act is predicated on a violation of state or local law, it can be no more effective
than the underlying state or local statutes upon which it is based.220
{54} Finally, the 1970 Crime Control Act, which introduced the Illegal Gambling Businesses Act,221
also included the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which was designed
to combat “the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating
in interstate commerce.”222 RICO targets those who have been linked to “a pattern of racketeering
activity”223 in association with a number of other prohibited forms of conduct.224 Racketeering activity
is defined to include “any act or threat involving . . . gambling . . . which is chargeable under State law
and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.”225 Racketeering activity may also include
any act indictable under the Wire Act, the Travel Act, the Paraphernalia Act, or the Illegal Gambling
Businesses Act.226 Although RICO differs from the previous gambling legislation because it offers
civil causes of action in addition to criminal sanctions, 227 the Act’s complexity may lead state or
federal prosecutors to favor the previously mentioned gambling statutes.228 Moreover, the use of RICO
to target third parties, such as credit card companies or issuing banks whose cards are used at online
gaming sites, has, so far, been unsuccessful.229
{55} As the above discussion of various federal statutes suggests, there are a number of laws that
might apply to Internet gaming operations (even though certain ones may need to be updated in order
to account for changes in technology); however, before a court may conclude that subject matter
jurisdiction is appropriate over a nonresident defendant, it must also consider whether Congress
intended to reach beyond U.S. borders in the application of a particular piece of legislation. It has
long been established that Congress may, under the Commerce Clause, forbid the transfer of gamingrelated instruments beyond the boundaries of a state,230 and it is likely that Congress also has the
extraterritorial power to regulate Internet gaming.231 However, although Congress may exercise this
extraterritorial power, it does not mean that Congress has done so in all gambling-related legislation.232
While some Congressional legislation provides an explicit reference or clear legislative intent to target
individuals beyond U.S. borders,233 the federal, gambling-related legislation is not as clear. 234 However
at least two courts have stated that the reference to “foreign commerce” in the Wire Act235 gives courts
extraterritorial subject matter jurisdiction over a foreign-based Internet gambling operator.236
{56} If no explicit statutory reference or clear legislative intent is found in gambling-related
legislation, one must apply the “effects test” as first outlined in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (ALCOA) in order to establish subject matter jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.237
According to the court’s decision, subject matter jurisdiction may be found when a nonresident
defendant’s activity intends to affect and does affect the U.S. domestic market.238 While a conflict
between U.S. and domestic law is given substantial weight in the court’s analysis of whether subject
matter jurisdiction can be exercised, this conflict is but one factor among several that the court should
consider in deciding whether to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.239 The fact that conduct is legal
and even strongly encouraged in a foreign state will not necessarily prevent the application of U.S.
law.240 A foreign enterprise’s express purpose to affect U.S. commerce and the “substantial nature of
the effect produced” may justify the exercise of U.S. subject matter jurisdiction.241 Given unregulated
Internet gaming’s social consequences,242 possible negative economic impacts on brick and mortar
casinos,243 and possible erosion of state tax revenues,244 subject matter jurisdiction should generally be
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found over a non-resident Internet gaming operation.245
{57} In order to evade subject matter jurisdiction, online gaming operations have argued that the
targeted gambling activities occurred abroad and in compliance with the laws of a foreign country.
The Internet gaming, so the argument goes, was therefore not subject to U.S. federal and state laws.246
However, this argument is unlikely to be successful where there is evidence of a specific illegal
transaction between a U.S. resident and an Internet gaming operator.247 For example, in People v.
World Interactive Gaming Corp., gamblers in New York wired money to an Antiguan bank account
in order to play at an online, Antiguan-licensed casino.248 In making its decision, the district court
referred to New York Penal Law under which gambling is considered to take place in New York if
the gambler is located in New York.249 The court concluded that bets transmitted from New York to
Antigua (where the gambling at issue was legal) via the Internet constituted gambling activity within
the State of New York.250 The court considered the virtual casino to be located within the user’s
computer;251 therefore, New York courts had subject matter jurisdiction, and the State of New York’s
gambling prohibitions, in addition to the provisions of the Wire Act, the Travel Act, and the Wagering
Paraphernalia Act, were pertinent.252
{58} Regardless of whether courts hold that the proscribed casino activity takes place on the resident
gambler’s computer or whether the prohibited activity is found to take place abroad and an “effects
and conflicts of law” analysis is therefore required, courts will likely assert subject matter jurisdiction
over Internet gaming operations wherever they may be.
B. Establishing Personal Jurisdiction
{59} If the law of the forum state is applicable to the nonresident, then the second part of the
jurisdiction analysis verifies whether the granting of jurisdiction under the forum’s law would satisfy
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.253 The Due Process Clause’s constitutional
protections extend to foreign defendants who are asked to appear in U.S. courts.254 This second
constitutional analysis involves, in turn, a multi-step analysis of its own.255
{60} It is first necessary to examine the relationship between the defendant and the forum. General
jurisdiction over the defendant may be established if there are “systematic and continuous” activities
by the defendant in the forum state, regardless of whether the cause of action’s subject matter has any
connection to the forum state. 256 In the absence of these systematic and continuous activities by the
defendant in the forum state, the link between the defendant and the forum may be established under
specific jurisdiction when “the plaintiff’s claim is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contact
with the forum.”257
{61} Regardless of whether general or specific jurisdiction is asserted, the defendant must have
established minimum contacts within the state by purposefully availing itself of “the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”258
Examples of such minimum contacts include “designing the product for the market in the forum State,
advertising in the forum State, [and] establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in
the forum State . . . .”259
{62} Throughout the second part of this analysis, an overarching concern is whether exercising
jurisdiction over the nonresident would offend traditional notions of “fair play and substantial
justice.”260 The defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State must be such “that he could
reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.”261 Others factors to be considered in the impreciseRichmond Journal of Law & Technology- Volume X, Issue 3
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sounding calculus of “fair play and substantial justice” include “‘the burden on the defendant,’ ‘the
forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief,’ ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies,’ and the ‘shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies.’”262 For nonresidents defendants in particular, a court may look at “[t]he unique
burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system” and give those burdens
“significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction
over national borders.”263
{63} In the context of an Internet transaction, courts have determined personal jurisdiction according
to a “sliding scale” by which “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised
is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over
the Internet.”264 In Zippo Manufacturing, the district court described this sliding scale in the following
terms:
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business
over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over
the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where
a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible
to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make
information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise
personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a
user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of
jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature
of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.265
Subsequent case law has suggested that companies whose websites offer lists of products sold, online
sales, ordering information, file downloads, and links to other websites are not considered “passive
websites.”266
{64} Internet gambling sites seem to fall into either the “clearly doing business” or “middle ground”
categories. For example, in State v. Granite Gate Resorts Inc.,267 a Minnesota court found personal
jurisdiction over a Nevada Internet gambling corporation, although it did not yet accept bets.
Jurisdiction was founded on the grounds that the site advertised on a Nevada tourist information web
page,268 maintained an online mailing list to keep potential customers updated on its forthcoming
launch of services,269 and displayed online a toll-free number for customer inquiries270 and a declaration
that the company reserved the right to sue the customer in his or her home state for breach of
contract.271 Minimum contacts have also been found when a fully functioning online casino advertised
over the Internet, required its customers to enter into contracts before playing games, and subsequently
sent prizes via regular mail to the customers’ residences.272
{65} Furthermore, an Internet casino’s efforts to deny gambling access to residents in a jurisdiction
where the gambling at issue is illegal will not be considered proof that the defendant did not knowingly
do business in that jurisdiction if the gambler can easily circumvent the casino’s safeguard measures.273
For example, in People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp.,274 users were required to enter their
physical address, and access was denied for jurisdictions where land-based gambling was illegal;
however, a gambler in a jurisdiction where land-based gambling was illegal only had to change his
or her address to a jurisdiction where land-based gambling was legal in order to access the Internet
gambling.275 Given the casino’s easily fooled jurisdiction-identification system, the court decided that
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the Internet casino could not defend itself by claiming that it had unknowingly accepted bets from
residents in New York, where unauthorized land-based gambling was illegal.276
{66} The forum State’s interest in limiting fraud or prohibiting gambling has been cited as a
substantive social policy justifying the exercise of personal jurisdiction (even if this interest is not,
on its own, determinative). In Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc.,277 in which a Texas gambler sued an
Internet casino for allegedly refusing to pay winnings, the court, in finding personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, noted that:
Texas clearly has a strong interest in protecting its citizens by adjudicating disputes
involving the alleged breach of contract, fraud, and violations of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act by an Internet casino on Texas residents. Furthermore, due regard
must be given to the Plaintiff’s choice to seek relief in Texas. These concerns outweigh
the burden created by requiring the Defendant to defend the suit in Texas.278
Similar language in other Internet gambling cases suggests a strong interest in finding jurisdiction over
a nonresident Internet operator.279 It therefore seems that most nonresident Internet gaming operations
will have established sufficient minimum contacts with the jurisdiction to justify a court’s assertion of
personal jurisdiction.
C. Enforcement
{67} A law’s actual scope depends upon a nation’s ability to enforce that law.280 Even if jurisdiction
can be established over a defendant and even though Congress has been willing to sanction a wide
range of individuals—from “high level bosses” to “street level employees”281 who have knowingly
affiliated themselves with a gambling business282--enforcement of a decision against a non-resident
with no presence beyond a website in the United States poses significant problems. Enforcement
measures under the current federal gambling legislation include fines, forfeiture of assets,
imprisonment, and/or the enjoining of FCC-regulated communications centers.283 Yet, with the
exception of the last measure (and even the Wire Act has only been used against American citizens),284
these penalties may not deter a foreign Internet gaming operator with limited ties to the United States
from seeking the business of America’s Internet gamblers. An arrest warrant issued by an American
court may prevent the owner of a foreign Internet gaming business from visiting the United States or
those countries whose extradition treaties and gambling laws might pose a risk for him,285 yet many
individuals may conclude that the economic benefits of the business outweigh its risks.
{68} Part of this enforcement problem is due to the underlying architecture of the Internet. As noted
in Part II, Congress has, in the past, recruited large communications networks in its efforts to combat
illegal gambling, including the postal and telephone systems. One can add radio and television to that
list. 286 Although these technologies’ architectures have significantly changed in the past few years,
their design at the time at which the relevant statutes were enacted and for subsequent decades was a
far cry from Internet architecture. First, the postal, radio, television, and telephone systems distributed
intelligence within the network. Postal service inspectors, telephone companies, and broadcasters
could analyze the types of messages sent and could then discriminate against certain types of content
or usage patterns. “One could design telephone networks to report with each call who was called,
where that person lives, how long the call lasted, and from which line it was made. Indeed, this is
how telephone networks today are designed.”287 Second, these systems were oriented towards focal
points, whether these were specific transmitters, central switches,288 or sorting facilities. Third, the
flow of information through these systems generally followed predictable paths. A letter sent from one
specific destination to another via the U.S. Postal Service follows a limited number of well-defined
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routes. One used to be able to say the same for telephone calls, television, and radio transmissions.
Taken together, these system characteristics enabled law enforcement officials to place pressure on
points of control or communication pathways in order to enforce content-based regulations.
{69} In contrast to this architecture:
•

•
•

Τhe Internet ideally pushes intelligence to the edge of the network so that “the network
simply moves the data and leaves the interpretation of the data to the applications at
either end.”289 IP protocols do not reveal “who sent the data, from where the data were
sent, to where (geographically) the data are going, for what purpose the data are going
there, or what kind of data they are.”290
Τhe Internet is less oriented towards focal points, and individual users can therefore
more easily bypass gatekeepers.291
Τhe Internet breaks its messages into packets which are “spewed across the system . . .
. [N]othing ensures that they will travel in the same way, or along the same path. They
take the most efficient path, which depends on the demand at any one time.”292

Given these characteristics, it is not surprising that the “the Net’s architecture has prominently
stymied control efforts.”293 While existing federal law, subject to minor modifications, supports state
Internet gambling policies to the extent that federal law is largely sufficient to establish personal and
subject matter jurisdiction over foreign Internet gaming operations, the lack of enforcement abilities
over nonresident defendants with few ties to the United States lessens the deterrence value of these
judgments.294
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR ENFORCING FEDERAL GAMBLING LEGISLATION
AGAINST INTERNET GAMBLING OPERATORS
{70} Given the distributed nature of the Internet and the off-shore locations of possible defendants,
attention is often focused on third parties affiliated with Internet gambling businesses. In order to
address the inaccessibility of off-shore Internet gaming operators, the House of Representatives and
Senate have proposed at least fifteen bills that have directly addressed Internet gambling since 1995,
although none have been successful.295 This paper now turns to common suggestions for undermining
Internet gambling operators: penalizing individual gamblers, blocking Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
via Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and targeting payment providers.
A. Penalizing Gamblers
{71} Sanctions against individual gamblers were proposed in earlier pieces of Congressional
Internet gambling legislation. As part of the 1995 Crime Prevention Act, Senator Jon Kyl included
an amendment to the Wire Act so that “individuals who gamble or wager via wire or electronic
communication are penalized -- not just those who are in the business of gambling.”296 Similarly,
under the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997, the Wire Act would have been expanded to
encompass
[w]hoever . . . knowingly uses a communication facility for the transmission or receipt
in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers, information assisting in the placing
of bets or wagers, or a communication that entitles the transmitter or receiver to the
opportunity to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers.297
{72} This effort to penalize individual gambling customers was inconsistent with past federal
gambling statutes.298 The Wire Act applies to those “engaged in the business of betting or wagering,”299
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and it does not apply to individual gamblers, regardless of the size or frequency of their bets.300
Although the language of The Travel Act seems broad enough to cover individuals,301 the Fifth Circuit
held in United States v. Roberson302 that “[t]he purpose of the [Travel] Act is clear: It aims to deny
those engaged in criminal business enterprise access to channels of interstate commerce. It is not aimed
at individual substantive offenses.”303 While the Wagering Paraphernalia Act applies to “[w]hoever,
except a common carrier in the usual course of its business” sends gambling-related material in
foreign or interstate commerce, the Act has, in practice, been applied to gambling businesses instead of
individual gamblers.304 As for the Illegal Gambling Business Act, it sanctions, as its title suggests, an
“illegal gambling business.”305
{73} Although one might argue that the difficulty of enforcing judgments against Internet gambling
operators justifies sanctioning Internet gamblers, prosecuting Internet gamblers may, in fact, be no
more feasible or effective than targeting Internet gaming operators. According to the U.S. Department
of Justice, legislation targeting bettors would divert resources that could better be spent on large
operations, and an over-broad law would result in inconsistent enforcement.306 G. Robert Blakey
and Harold Kurland offer a different argument against federal legislation that focuses on individual
gamblers: “Only in prosecuting large-scale gambling operations does the federal government possess
a significant enforcement advantage . . . . Regulation of the individual bettor should remain a matter
of state law; no justification appears for deviating from the federal practice of noninterference with
state policies.”307 Fortunately, the effort to target Internet gamblers has not appeared in bills proposed
subsequent to 1997.
B. ISPs
{74} Under the Wire Act, common carriers, upon law enforcement’s request, are required to refuse or
to terminate the service of those transmitting illegal gambling information.308 Many of the proposed
Congressional bills, regardless of whether they modify the Wire Act or whether they propose new
sections to the U.S. Code, follow this same approach on the Internet.309 An ISP would have an
obligation, upon having received specific instructions from law enforcement agencies regarding a
particular site, to discontinue or to refuse access to the designated site (presumably by blocking the IP
address).310 Failure on the part of the ISP to act would place the ISP in violation of, for example, the
proposed Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act.311
{75} However, there are several problems with updating the Wire Act in order to force ISPs to
block IP addresses. First, several websites may share the same IP address, with one researcher
estimating that approximately 87% of active .com, .net and, .org web sites use shared IP
addresses.312 Consequently, while an unlawful Internet casino whose IP address is blocked
may not be able to invoke First Amendment rights,313 a site that is the victim of over-inclusive
Internet blocking may.314 Second, since a site’s URL and IP address are distinct, an Internet
gambling operator could change IP addresses without changing its URL. Its clients need never
know that their favorite gambling site has changed IP addresses because they would still type
the same address into their browser. Of course, an enforcement system, in order to be effective,
need not be perfect.315 For example, a gambler who connects to an offshore ISP in order to
access a gambling site will have to pay a long-distance rate, and an Internet gambling site whose
IP address has been blocked will have to spend time and money to find another one if it wants
to continue to service American customers. However, given the significant profits to be gained
from servicing Americans’ appetite for Internet gambling, the costs associated with IP blocking
do not seem likely to encourage compliance with Internet gambling regulations.
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{76} A third concern is often raised with respect to state-based ISP regulations. If all states
forbade Internet gambling (and had comparable definitions of “Internet gambling”), then
Nevada would not object if Utah enjoined an ISP to block the IP address of an Australian
Internet gambling site, even if that ISP also served Nevada residents. Utah would, in fact, be
helping Nevada to enforce its anti-Internet gambling policy. However, what would happen
if Nevada legalized Internet gambling? Utah’s law enforcement actions would then seem
like unwelcome intrusions into Nevada and potential violations of the Dormant Commerce
Clause.316
{77} There is a vision of ISPs as “Internet police, not only cordoning off areas from view
when acting as hosts of content, but also more broadly restricting access to particular networked entities with whom their customers wish to communicate -- thus determining what
those customers can see, wherever it might be online.”317 For better or for worse, that day has
not yet come. Absent more accurate technology,318 IP blocking is constitutionally dubious and
of questionable efficacy regardless of whether it is instituted at the state or federal level.
{78} Even setting aside the problems with IP blocking, there is a strong argument that the Wire
Act needs to be reexamined. The extent to which the Wire Act manifests federal disregard for state
gambling policy makes it a rarity among federal gambling statutes. The Illegal Gambling Business
Act is predicated upon a “violation of the law of the State or political subdivision in which it is
conducted;”319 the Travel Act applies to a gambling enterprise “in violation of the laws of the State in
which they are committed or of the United States;”320 the Johnson Act, which, as discussed in Part II,
regulates the interstate transport of certain gambling devices, has an exception for jurisdictions that
have legalized the equipment at issue;321 and the Wagering Paraphernalia Act provides an exception for
“the transportation of betting materials to be used in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event
into a State in which such betting is legal under the statutes of that State.”322 However, the Wire Act
forbids interstate wagering, even when the wager is to and from a jurisdiction where the gambling at
issue is legal.323 It is difficult to argue, as is generally done with respect to federal gambling policy, that
the Wire Act “prevent[s] interference by one State with the gambling policies of another”324 when both
states have legalized the gambling at issue. Instead, the rationale may be one that was put forth by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals when it wrote that the Wire Act was “part of an independent federal
policy aimed at those who would, in furtherance of any gambling activity, employ any means within
direct federal control.” 325 Similarly, a Justice Department employee, in his testimony before a House
committee in 1950, referred to “a Nationwide policy against gambling, particularly commercialized
gambling.”326
{79} The idea of a nationwide federal policy against gambling, regardless of whether it is sanctioned
by the states in which it takes place, is at odds with the traditional deference to state legislatures.
Although one might argue that this policy is perfectly consistent with the targeting of large-scale
gaming operations in the interest of fighting crime, 327 this connection between legalized gambling and
crime is highly debatable.328 Moreover, it is unclear why a federal statute that required the underlying
interstate activity to be illegal in at least one of the jurisdictions would undermine crime-fighting
measures. Currently, an Internet gambling business in full compliance with its jurisdiction’s laws that
offered its services to a client in another jurisdiction in which Internet gambling was legal might be
subject to sanctions under the Wire Act. Although this had been true since the 1960’s with respect
to telephone gambling, it is not clear that the original rationale for the Wire Act -- to combat mafiainfiltrated bookmakers329 -- is still valid several decades later with respect to either telephone gambling
or a potentially heavily regulated on-line gambling industry.
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{80} To the extent that the Wire Act is still useful in combating large-scale, illegal gambling
operations conducted via certain communications facilities, Congress might keep the act but extend
the Wire Act’s safe harbor provisions330 to include the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce
of bets from a state or foreign country where the betting at issue is legal into a state or foreign
country in which that betting is also legal. There are several reasons for doing so. First, permitting
the transmission of “information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers,” as provided in the Wire
Act’s safe harbor provision,331 but not the transmission of “bets or wagers” is a tenuous distinction.
The exemption for “information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers” was originally designed
with horseracing betting in mind,332 and that industry has subsequently gained the opportunity to
accept interstate wagers under certain conditions.333 Second, while it was relatively easy to determine
whether a wager via telephone was interstate by simply determining the location of the caller and the
person being called, it is more difficult to determine the precise location of a single Internet gambling
operator that may be incorporated in one state and use a server in another location. If liberally
construed or broadly reworded, the Wire Act might constitute a ban on Internet gambling, regardless
of individual state policies. Finally, limiting the Wire Act’s applicability would accord greater respect
to foreign jurisdictions and prevent accusations of international trade agreement violations against
the United States, such as that recently leveled by Antigua and Barbuda before the World Trade
Organization.334
{81} By extending the Wire Act’s safe harbor to include interstate wagers from and to jurisdictions
in which the wagers are legal, the federal government would be able to continue to fight against a
wide range of gambling targets while showing greater respect to state policies. Although the Wire Act
would be of limited use against Internet gambling operators, an expanded safe harbor provision might
be relevant in the event that IP blocking becomes more technologically accurate.
C. Payment Providers
{82} In the past, states have attacked illegal gambling by undermining its payment channels. One
way of doing this has been through contract law. In particular, loans for gambling are not enforceable
in most states under state statutes or under general public policy.335 Consequently, casinos have
had difficulty recovering money from gamblers even in jurisdictions where the gambling at issue
is legal.336 However, if the lender did not know that the loan was to be used for an illegal purpose,
then the debt may be enforceable.337 This rationale has been used to find that bettors were liable for
cash advances from their credit card companies because the latter were not knowing participants in
the bettors’ gambling.338 Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that there are no hard and fast rules
regarding the enforceability of gambling debts. The analysis is highly fact-specific,339 and this creates
an uncertain legal environment for casinos and payment providers, both off and on the Internet.
{83} This contractual approach has met with mixed success in addressing Internet casino gambling.
Since credit cards have been the most frequently used payment method for Internet gambling, cases
regarding the enforceability of Internet gambling debt have focused on them. 340 For example, a
California resident who had been sued by credit card companies for over $70,000 in Internet gambling
expenses spread out over twelve cards argued that her debt was unenforceable because the gambling
merchants, whose operations were alleged to be illegal under California law, should never have been
given merchant accounts.341 The suit settled out of court,342 and several banks have subsequently
limited the Internet gambling transactions permitted on their cards.343
{84} Online gamblers seeking to avoid their credit card debts have used civil suits under RICO,344
but these gamblers have had less success than the aforementioned California plaintiff. One judge
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described these online gamblers as “independent actors who made a knowing and voluntary choice to
engage in a course of conduct. Litigation over their own actions arose only when the result of those
actions became a debt that they did not wish to pay.”345 Furthermore, in Jubelirer v. MasterCard
Intermational, Inc., the judge emphasized the distant relationship between the credit card company and
its “more than 10 million merchants.”346 Such a characterization may make it difficult for courts to
hold that credit card companies had knowledge of a client’s specific gambling expenditures.347
{85} Establishing that the debt at issue involves a contract that is separate from the gambling activity
“may serve to rebut arguments that it is illegal, void, or unenforceable.”348 In other words, the more
distance that the credit card company can place between its extension of credit to the customer and the
customer’s charges to the Internet gambling operation, the better the chances that the credit card loan
will be enforceable. Credit card transactions may involve multiple contracts between, for example,
credit organizations, issuing banks, merchant banks, the gambler, and the casino, each of which may
be located in a different jurisdiction.349 Without delving into the details of the credit card hierarchy,
the issuing bank is often the primary party affected when gamblers contest their suits, although the
merchant bank has the closest connection to the gambling operator.350 When one also considers that
Internet casinos may deceive credit card companies regarding the nature of their transactions351 and that
intermediate electronic accounts that are established using credit cards can be used to purchase a range
of products and services (gambling being one among many),352 it may not be difficult for the issuing
bank or other parties in the credit hierarchy to argue for the enforceability of the debts on the grounds
that they did not know of the illegal purpose for which the extended credit was eventually used.353 It
should be noted that if clients are nonetheless successful in invalidating their gambling-related debts,
this outcome may encourage gambling by creating a win-win situation for gamblers: they would not be
obliged to pay their debts but might be able to collect their winnings.
{86} Rather than having residents rely solely upon contractual unenforceability theories, states have
also sought the cooperation of payment providers in order to address illegal gambling, both on and
off of the Internet. In 1997, the Florida Attorney General’s Office and Western Union entered into an
“Agreement of Voluntary Cooperation,” by which the latter agreed to limit money transfers to specified
offshore bookmakers, which used the telephone, mail, and the Internet as means of communications. 354
More recently, under pressure from the New York Attorney General’s Office, Citibank, and the online
payment provider PayPal agreed to block online gambling transactions.355 Furthermore, American
Express and Discover prohibit the use of their cards for Internet gambling transactions, while Visa
and MasterCard are making increasing efforts to ensure that Internet gambling activities are correctly
identified (thereby providing banks with the possibility of refusing these transactions).356
{87} A variety of federal proposals and regulations have been put forth in order to reduce the
availability of Internet gambling payment methods. The National Gambling Impact Study Commission
recommended national legislation that would have rendered unenforceable credit card debts incurred
while gambling over the Internet.357 A feature of Internet gambling bills that first began appearing in
2000 would prohibit all Internet gambling operators358 or all “unlawful” Internet gambling operators
from “knowingly accept[ing]” a forbidden payment method.359 These prohibited payment methods are
described as broadly as possible so as to include, for example, credit cards, electronic fund transfers,
checks, and “any other form of financial transaction as the Secretary [of the Treasury] may prescribe
by regulation which involves a financial institution as a payor or financial intermediary on behalf of or
for the benefit of the other person.”360
{88} The Internet Gambling Payments Prohibition Act would have enabled federal banking agencies
to order insured depository institutions not to facilitate the financial transactions of those violating
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Volume X, Issue 3

Jonathan Gottfried- The Federal Framework for Internet Gambling
the Act,361 and several bills would have allowed state and federal law enforcement agencies to obtain
injunctions against financial intermediaries that were deemed necessary to prevent violations of illegal
Internet gambling transactions.362
{89} A more recent Senate bill even proposes the creation of an “Office of Electronic Funding
Oversight” under the Department of Treasury “to coordinate Federal efforts to prohibit restricted
transactions.”363 This office would create compulsory payment system policies and procedures
for identifying and blocking restricted transactions which would be enforced by the Federal Trade
Commission.364
{90} Is novel federal legislation necessary to ensure the assistance of payment providers in targeting
unlawful gambling? Without any new federal legislation, the threat of lawsuits, and perhaps the
threat posed by Congressional legislation have significantly reduced the involvement in Internet
gambling of U.S.-based banks, credit card companies, and other online payment providers.365 It has
been estimated that Internet gambling operators whose business relied on U.S. cardholders saw their
revenues decline by 35-40% in 2000.366 Given that many banks and credit cards have operations in
multiple states, a change of policy mandated in one state often leads to a change in policy throughout
the rest of the company’s operations.367 This is not to state that Americans can no longer play and pay
at illegal Internet casinos. Although most U.S.-based merchant banks may block Internet gambling
transactions, credit-card association members in jurisdictions where gambling is legal continue to
accept Internet gambling merchants.368 A 2002 General Accounting Office survey indicated that 85%
of those sites surveyed listed MasterCard and Visa as payment methods.369 However, if the issuing
bank is American-based, then the transaction will probably be blocked. It has become more difficult
for Internet gambling operations to do business with American consumers because their transactions
are subject to greater scrutiny and rejection.370
{91} Yet leaving regulation of payment providers to the states will not be an effective solution if some
states legalize Internet gambling. North Dakota, acting alone or in conjunction with South Dakota and
Minnesota, might have considerable difficulty influencing payment providers and is unlikely to be as
successful as New York has been. Furthermore, the previous paragraph dealt primarily with creditrelated transactions, although online payment providers like PayPal can also be linked directly to bank
accounts. Internet gambling operators will likely respond to the above trends by shifting to non-credit
based payment methods,371 such as debit cards or various forms of electronic currency. Allowing
law enforcement authorities to enjoin payment providers in a fashion similar to the process used for
“common carriers” under the Wire Act is the basic approach envisioned by recent Congressional
legislation,372 and this would cover a comprehensive range of financial institutions and payment
methods, promising to cut the link between Internet gambling and America’s banking system.373
While Congress might adopt a wait-and-see approach to determine whether states can reach voluntary
agreements with U.S.-based final institutions to address the next generation of payment providers,374
legislation directly targeting payments to illegal gambling would “put practical enforcement ‘teeth’
in place that could eliminate most of the revenues online gaming operators receive from the U.S.
market.”375
D. Online/Offline Neutrality
{92} Any legislation that Congress passes affecting Internet gambling should be faithful to the notion
of online/offline consistency. As the Presidential Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet
stated, “substantive regulation of unlawful conduct (e.g., legislation providing for civil or criminal
penalties for given conduct) should, as a rule, apply in the same way to conduct in the cyberworld as
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it does to conduct in the physical world.”376 Legislation that is built upon a snapshot of an evolving
technology may not only inhibit that technology from evolving to address the underlying concerns,377
such legislation also threatens to become less relevant as the technology changes.378 While this notion
seems uncontroversial in the abstract, Congress has often hesitated to adopt it in its Internet gambling
proposals.
{93} Congressional Internet gambling bills that have proposed bans on Internet gambling activities
have often created a double standard. For example, under the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of
1997,379 a convicted online gambler would have faced a maximum sentence of four years in prison
and could have been fined the greater of (i) $20,000, or (ii) the amount wagered over the Internet.380 In
contrast, a gambler who illegally gambled offline would likely be untouched by federal anti-gambling
statutes.381
{94} This online, offline double standard was also evident in some of the Internet gambling payment
provider legislation. One of the bills would have allowed a situation where a gambler could have used
one form of payment at a lawful brick and mortar gambling operation but could not have used the same
form of payment at a lawful Internet gambling operation.382
{95} The double standards present in Congressional bills often cannot be justified by the technology
at issue. For example, if the argument in favor of the bills that targeted payment providers for Internet
gambling operations383 was that restricting payments was a means to an end,384 then there is no good
reason why that “end” should not have been “unlawful gambling” instead of “unlawful Internet
gambling.” This might have led payment providers to further develop safeguard measures against
all forms of unlawful gambling, rather than just against unlawful Internet gaming, and it would have
assisted law enforcement authorities in cutting off access to unlawful, more “traditional” off-shore
gaming operations,385 as well as in cutting off access to unlawful, Internet-based gambling operations.
{96} Furthermore, there is little reason for the proposed payment provider bills to focus on the
Internet in order to ground themselves in a Constitutionally-permissible exercise of Congressional
power. Perhaps the rationale was that Internet gambling, because of its normally cross-border
nature, is clearly within Congress’s powers under the Commerce clause, whereas other types of
gambling may not be; however, a reference to the Internet may not be sufficient and is not necessary
to make such an act constitutionally valid. First, gambling over the Internet may be limited purely to
within state boundaries,386 thereby placing Congress in the situation of regulating intrastate activity.
Second, while earlier acts like the 1890 Act (banning, among other items, newspapers with gambling
advertisements and lottery-related registered letters from the mail) were clearly grounded in Congress’s
postal power,387 and while the Wire and Travel Acts both make references to “interstate or foreign
commerce,” 388 the Organized Crime Control Act was premised upon the broad assumption that “illegal
gambling involves widespread use of, and has an effect upon, interstate commerce and the facilities
thereof.”389 Courts have subsequently upheld this Act, not requiring an explicit showing of connection
with interstate commerce in order to establish a conviction under it.390 Payment providers may be
one step removed from gambling operations; however, their link to them and the likelihood that these
payment providers, themselves, will be agents of interstate commerce make invocation of the Internet
constitutionally unnecessary in the Congressional legislation.391
{97} Another argument in favor of the focus on the Internet in payment provider legislation is that
credit is dangerous in the hands of Internet gamblers who, in the heat of the game, may rack up
enormous debts.392 These concerns, however, extend beyond Internet gaming operations. With respect
to brick and mortar casinos, the NGIS Commission noted that
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[o]ne of the issues of most concern to this Commission is the ready availability of
credit in and around casinos, which can lead to irresponsible gambling and problem
and pathological gambling behavior. Forty to sixty percent of the cash wagered by
individuals in casinos is not physically brought onto the premises.393
Congressional legislation that focuses on the dangers of a novel industry, while ignoring similar
threats posed by better-established business interests, risks being accused of indulging in inappropriate
market protectionism.394
{98} Congressional Internet gambling legislation has been a response to a particular type of Internet
gambling -- a loosely regulated one. Such businesses, however, need not be the only model. By
outlawing the conduct at issue,395 the legislation might allow the technology to develop in order to
address the questionable conduct. If Congress is intent on targeting payment providers, Congress
should pass an Unlawful Gambling Funding Prohibition Act instead of proposing an Unlawful
Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act.396 As the Department of Justice has noted, Congressional
“legislation . . . should be applied to illegal gambling, whether that gambling occurs over the
telephone, or whether that gambling occurs over the internet, or whether that gambling occurs in any
other way.”397
VI. CONCLUSION
{99} Online gaming has not escaped the states’ regulatory abilities, and most prosecutions against
online gaming operators have, in fact, been brought by state attorneys general using state law.398
Unregulated Internet gaming, however, has undermined states’ abilities to determine their gaming
policies, and current federal legislation, while sufficient to establish subject matter and personal
jurisdiction over nonresident Internet gaming operators, lacks adequate enforcement mechanisms
to support the states. Consequently, reforms to federal gambling legislation that are written in as
“medium-neutral” a fashion as possible should focus on empowering law enforcement authorities
to enjoin payment providers from servicing gambling businesses that operate in jurisdictions where
the gambling at issue is illegal. In contrast, the Wire Act will be of limited use against unlawful
Internet gaming because of the constitutional and technological problems underlying IP blocking.
Furthermore, Congress should reexamine the assumption of a connection between crime and all
gambling -- legal and illegal -- that underlies the Wire Act’s broad wording. This might lead Congress
to repeal the Wire Act or to expand its safe harbor to include wagers from and to jurisdictions in which
the gambling at issue is legal. Should IP blocking technology become more precise, Congress might
also consider updating the Wire Act to apply to casino-style games399 and ensuring that the Act applies
to a broad range of communications, regardless of whether they are “wired.”400 Revising the Wagering
Paraphernalia Act to include items, such as websites, might additionally be considered; however, since
the Act’s sanctions are limited to prison and/or fines, it would not be effective against nonresident
defendants with few ties to the United States.
{100} In keeping with traditional deference of the federal government to states in the realm of
gambling, states should have the discretion to decide whether to permit or prohibit Internet gaming
operations within their borders. The relationship between the federal government and states in matters
of gambling should be no different after the advent of Internet blackjack than it was before.
{101} The regulations of the Nevada Gaming Commission total over 1,100 pages,401 and regulations
of Internet gaming would probably be no less complex. The above discussion has merely sought to
emphasize that the differences between online and offline gaming do not justify radical legislative
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departures from federal gambling policy. Consequently, neither federal prohibition nor surrender to
the market’s invisible hand is warranted. The limited Congressional action suggested above, rather
than being an example of Congressional disregard for state powers, would in fact strengthen states’
decision-making abilities and would follow in the footsteps of a delicate state-federal government
equilibrium in the realm of gaming.
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140

Id. § 7-20 (citing HOWARD SHAFFER, ET AL., ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE OF DISORDERED GAMBLING BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA: A META-ANALYSIS 5 (1997)).
141

142

Id. § 7-24.

Id. § 7-20 (citing HOWARD SHAFFER ET AL., ESTIMATING THE PREVALENCE OF DISORDERED GAMBLING BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA: A META-ANALYSIS 5 (1997)).
143

See, e.g., Drugs and the Internet, An Overview of the Threat to America’s Youth, NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER
(Dec. 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs0/682/internet.htm#Top (last visited Oct. 4, 2003) (noting that “85
percent of Americans aged 12-24 now use the Internet regularly”).
144

145

Productivity Inquiry Report, supra note 62, § 18.22 (emphasis added).

Productivity Inquiry Report, supra note 62, §§ 18-22 to 18-23. The contract that players must sign during the
registration process may also invalidate any prizes won by minors. For example, Lasseters’ contract states “[w]innings are
subject to Lasseters Online verification procedures before payment.” Lasseters Online, Terms and Conditions, § 11, at
http://www.lasseters.com.au/footer/terms.asp (last updated May 2002). Moreover,
146

All Players must be at least 18 years of age to be eligible to register with Lasseters Online and play for
cash or points, and to qualify for any prizes. The placement of any bets by minors is an offence under
Australian law the provision of any false particulars to Lasseters Online in relation to age, name and
address also constitutes a chargeable offence under law.
Id. § 3.4.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (2000) (“A cardholder shall be liable for the unauthorized use of a credit card only if ...
the liability is not in excess of $50.”).
147

See, e.g., John Warren Kindt, The Failure to Regulate the Gambling Industry Effectively: Incentives for Perpetual
Non-Compliance, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 219, 238 (2003) (“[T]wo Missouri riverboat casinos, Station and Harrah’s, were each
fined $250,000 for an incident in June, 2000 when a 16-year-old girl used false identification to board and gamble . . . .”);
John Warren Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized Gambling Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 75 (1994) (noting that
“Despite laws in Atlantic City restricting the casinos to persons twenty-one years and over, a [1985] survey of teenagers
in an Atlantic City high school revealed 64% of the teenagers had gambled in a [brick ‘n mortar] casino . . . ”); Bell, supra
note 127 (“[Gambling] [w]eb sites have an advantage over their offline counterparts. The former can automatically check
the identity and age of every player who walks through the virtual door. The latter rely, at best, on hunches about high heels
and facial hair. State lotteries, which sell tickets through machines, do even less to guard against underage gambling.”).
148

Gaming Control (Internet Gaming) Regulations § 61 (N. Terr. 2002), available at http://notes.nt.gov.au/dcm/legislat/
legislat.nsf/0/888cad441702eaab69256c670082bac2/$FILE/Repg006R7.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2003).
149

150

Productivity Inquiry Report, supra note 62, § 18.22.

151

See Netbets, supra note 58, § 4.52.
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See Rychlak, supra note 130, at 344 (“Some of the newer Mississippi casinos even have playrooms and video arcades
for children. If parents begin bringing their children to the casinos on a regular basis, it can become a family tradition just
like going to a baseball game or going on a picnic.”).
152

153

Productivity Inquiry Report, supra note 62, §§ 18.22 to 18.23.

Id. (“[H]ome-based gambling does represent an increase in exposure, which may further normalise gambling. Whether
this is seen as an adverse outcome depends on complex judgments about community and family norms.”).
154

155

2001 Nev. Stat. 3(2)(b).

AUS Model, supra note 65, at 20.

156

E-mail from Lasseters Online Customer Support to Jonathan Gottfried (June 5, 2003) (on file with Richmond Journal of
Law & Technology).
157

Lasseters Online, Terms of Use, § 1.9, at http://www.lasseters.com.au/defaultnew.asp?bodyPage=terms&pagePath=restri
cted&ext=asp (last modified Sept. 2003).
158

Id. § 1.10. Procedures such as that of Lasseters Online are more likely to be effective when the customer base is
geographically limited. For example, a Nevada operator is less likely to know whether a water bill from the occasional
customer in Liberia is legitimate than to know whether a water bill from his own state is legitimate.
159

See, e.g., Paymentech L.P., Address Verification Service, at http://www.paymentech.com/sol_frapro_carnotpre_
carasctoo_page.jsp (last modified Sept. 8, 2003); Paymentech L.P., Age Verification, at http://www.paymentech.com/sol_
frapro_carnotpre_agever_page.jsp (last modified Sept. 8, 2003).
160

John Edmond Hogan, World Wide Wager: The Feasibility of Internet Gambling Regulation; 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J.
815, 823 n.36 (1998).
161

Lawrence Lessig, Privacy, Jurisdiction and the Regulation of Free Expression, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0
vs. Filtering, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 629, 649-50 (1998).
162

See Michael A. Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1345, 1395 (2001) (providing descriptions of various companies that claim to identify the physical locations of
individuals based on IP analysis with up to 99% accuracy for targeting states). But see Benjamin Edelman, Shortcomings
and Challenges in the Restriction of Internet Transmissions of Over-the-Air Television Content to Canadian Internet
Users, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET AND SOCIETY, available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/pubs/jump091701.pdf (last modified Sept. 8, 2003). Mr. Edelman argues that:
163

the accuracy of geographic analysis systems – which is substantially impeded in the first place by the
lack of reliable information about the location of the devices identified with particular IP addresses – is
further hindered by the rise in deployment of proxy servers, tunneling systems, and terminal services.
Such systems can cause geographic analysis systems to draw erroneous conclusions about the locations
of end users; thus, their increased use reduces the accuracy of geographic analysis tools.
Id.
See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 50, at 1120 (stating that “government regulates an activity by raising the activity’s
costs in a manner that achieves desired ends”).
164

165

See supra note 7 and surrounding text.

See, e.g., Ill. P.A. 91-257 2g1(A)(C) (criminalizing both the Internet gambling operator as well as the Internet gambler);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.90.3 (West 1998) (making a misdemeanor a transaction via the Internet involving “a game,
contest, lottery, or contrivance whereby a person risks the loss of anything of value in order to realize a profit”); South
Dakota HB 1110 (Enrolled) sec. 7-9 (sanctioning anyone “engaged in a gambling business”); Oregon SB 318, NRS
465.091 (targeting payment methods to Internet gaming operators as well as collection of gaming debts); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 465.092 (Michie 1997) (sanctioning Internet betting as well as any operator who accepts a wager from a person
within Nevada).
166
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See, e.g., People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 861 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that an
Internet gambling operation violated section 225 of the New York Penal Code, which prohibits “unlawful gambling
activity”); see also Joel Michael Schwarz, The Internet Gambling Fallacy Craps Out, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1021, 103536 (1999) (arguing that Internet gambling is illegal in New York, Indiana, New Jersey and Wisconsin based on general
gambling statutes in those states).
167

See, e.g., Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the Minnesota
attorney general filed suit against a Belizean Internet gaming operator); World Interactive Gaming Corp. supra note 67
(noting that a New York attorney general filed suit against a Delaware corporation with an Antiguan casino subsidiary).
Also, New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer has reached agreements with Citibank and PayPal to limit online payments
from New York to gambling operators. See Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Press Release,
Agreement Reached with PayPal to Bar New Yorkers from OnLine Gambling (Aug. 21, 2002), at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug21a_02.html.
168

Hearings on Proposals to Regulate Illegal Internet Gambling: Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban
Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Richard Blumenthal, Connecticut State Attorney General, Representing the
National Association of Attorney Generals), available at http://www.senate.gov/~banking/03_03hrg/031803/blumenth.htm.
169

See id.; see also Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Technology and Terrorism, 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement of Betty, Ohio Attorney General Montgomery), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/oldsite/32399bm.htm. In
her testimony, Ms. Montgomery gives, as one rationale for supporting federal gambling legislation, that “law enforcement
resources of the State of Ohio, even as part of a coordinated response by several states, can have only a limited effect on
Internet gambling.” Id.
170

171

National Gambling Final Report, supra note 1 at 5-12, at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/5.pdf.

See Hogan, supra note 161, at 851 (noting that “virtually all known Internet gambling providers remaining within the
United States have sold or relocated their sites”).
172

173

Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 742 (W.D. Tex. 1998).

174

18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2003).

175

Exec. Order No. 13,333, App. F § 2 (Aug. 5, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/append.htm.

176

18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2003). The Act offers safe-harbor for
the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of information for use in news reporting of sporting
events or contests, or for the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a
sporting event or contest from a State or foreign country where betting on that sporting event or contest is
legal into a State or foreign country in which such betting is legal.

Id.
177

18 U.S.C. § 1084(d) (2003).

178

National Gambling Final Report, supra note 1 at 5-12, at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/5.pdf.

179

Id.

Adrian Goss, Jay Cohen’s Brave New World: The Liability of Offshore Operators of Licensed Internet Casinos for
Breach of United States Anti-Gambling Laws, 7 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 32 (2001).
180

181

United States v. McDonough, 835 F.2d 1103, 1104 (5th Cir. 1988).

182

Sagansky v. United States, 358 F.2d 195, 198-99 (1st Cir. 1966).

183

See GAO Report, supra note 75, at 16.
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Letter from Robert Kennedy, Attorney General, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Aug. 6, 1961)
(reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2634).
184

185

People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 850-51 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).

See GAO Report, supra note 75, at 3 (stating that the “DOJ generally takes the view that the Wire Act is not limited to
sports-related gambling activities, but case law on this issue is conflicting”). But see Statement of Kevin V. DiGregory,
supra note 49 (stating that the Wire Act “may relate only to sports betting and not to the type of real-time interactive
gambling (e.g., poker) that the Internet now makes possible for the first time”).
186

187

In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001).

188

Id. at 480.

189

Id. at 482.

“As to the legislative intent at the time the Wire Act was enacted, the House Judiciary Committed Chairman explained
that ‘this particular bill involves the transmission of wagers or bets and layoffs on horse racing and other sporting events.’”
Id. at 480-81 (citing 107 CONG. REC. 16533 (1961)). But see Schwarz, supra note 167, at 1030. In his article, Mr. Schwarz
notes:
190

[T]he legislative history of the Wire Act indicates that it was intended to be applied broadly so as to
prevent any interstate or international transmission of gambling information to or from the United States
using wire communication facilities. As former U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy wrote, “[t]he
purpose of [the Wire Act] is to aid . . . in the suppression of organized gambling activities by prohibiting
the use of or the leasing, furnishing, or maintaining of wire communication facilities which are or will be
used for the transmission of certain gambling information in interstate and foreign commerce.”
Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 87-967, at 1 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631)).
In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 481 (E.D. La. 2001) (citing Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999,
S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999)). In support of the argument that the Wire Act does not cover non-sports-related gambling,
one might point to the title of the Wire Act legislation: Sporting Events -- Transmission of Bets, Wagers, and Related
Information, Pub. L. No. 87-216, § 2, 75 Stat. 491, 552-53 (1961). One might also compare the Wire Act to the Wagering
Paraphernalia Act, both of which were enacted by Congress in 1961 as part of the fight against organized crime. Whereas
the Wagering Paraphernalia Act specifically refers in separate subsections to “bookmaking,” “wagering pools with respect
to a sporting event,” “numbers, policy, bolita or similar game,” 18 U.S.C. § 1953(a), the Wire Act refers only to “bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest.” 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2003).
191

192

18 U.S.C. § 1081 (2003).

193

GAO Report, supra note 75, at 17.

194

18 U.S.C. § 1081 (2003).

195

Goss, supra note 180, ¶ 22.

196

Id. ¶ 21.

197

Cheyenne Sales, Ltd. v. Western Union Financial Services Int’l, 8 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1998).

198

Id. at 474.

199

18 U.S.C. § 1953 (2002).

200

18 U.S.C. § 1953(a) (2002).

People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 853 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999). It is unclear in this case why
the court did not recognize the exception for “the transportation of betting materials to be used in the placing of bets
or wagers on a sporting event into a State in which such betting is legal under the statutes of that State.” 18 U.S.C. §
201
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1953(b)(2) (2003).
107 CONG. REC. 16,537 (1961) (statement of Rep. Emmanuel Celler, Chair, House Jud. Comm.). The legislative history
of the Paraphernalia Act suggests a broad reading of the statute’s applicability based on the fact that it was enacted to close
loopholes created by narrow court interpretations of anti-lottery statutes. See H.R. REP. NO. 87-968 (1961), reprinted in
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2634.
202

203

United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1989).

Id. at 1187. The Court stated, “Congress employed broad language to ‘permit law enforcement to keep pace with the
latest developments . . .’ because organized crime has shown ‘great ingenuity in avoiding the law.’” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO.
87-589).
204

205

Id.

206

Brown, supra note 15, at 635.

Pic-A-State Pa., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, No. 1: CV-93-0814, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12790 (M.D. Pa. July 23, 1993),
overruled on separate grounds by Pic-A-State Pa. v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Revenue, 42 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1994).
207

208

Id. at *9.

209

United States v. Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1974).

18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2003). “Facility” has been held to include telephone lines. See United States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp.
907 (E.D. Ill. 1962).
210

211

The Travel Act does not offer any definition of “gambling,” making this a question of statutory interpretation.

United States v. Barrow, 363 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1966) (using Travel Act against employees of illegal casinos who crossed
state lines in order to commute to their jobs).
212

See, e.g., United States v. Villano, 529 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1971)
(noting the Travel Act was used to prosecute a bookmaker who conducted his illegal interstate operations via telephone).
213

214

Cabot, supra note 95, at 130.

215

People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851-52 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).

Id. One of the unsuccessful plaintiffs in In re MasterCard alleged a violation of the Travel Act against a credit card
company and issuing bank whose card the plaintiff had used at an Internet casino. In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp.
2d 468, 478 (E.D. La. 2001). However, the court never addressed this issue because it failed to find a predicate violation of
state or federal law. Id. at 482.
216

217

18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1) (2003).

GAO Report, supra note 75, at 14; see also United States v. Schullo, 363 F. Supp. 246, 249-50 (D. Minn. 1973), aff’d,
508 F.2d 1200 (1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975) (“Congress’ intent was to include all those who participate in
the operation of a gambling business, regardless of how minor their roles, and whether they be labeled agents, runners,
independent contractors or the like.”).
218

See, e.g., United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that the Act is nonetheless grounded in the
Commerce Clause); United States v. Kerrigan, 514 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1975).
219

United States v. Truesdale, 152 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1998). The court reversed a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1955 for
failure to prove an underlying offense of Texas law.
220

James H. Frey, Federal Involvement in U.S. Gaming Regulation, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 138, 142
(1998).
221
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222

S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 80 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 38621, 39906.

18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2003). A “‘pattern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one
of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years [excluding any
period of imprisonment] after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. Id.
223

224

See SF42 ALI-ABA 827, 830 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d)(2003)). 18 U.S.C. § 1962 states, in part:
(a) Using or investing income that is derived from a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt in an enterprise; (b) Acquiring or maintaining an interest in or control of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of unlawful debt; (c) Conducting the
affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. § 1962
(c); and (d) Conspiring to commit one of these three acts.

Id.
225

18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (2003).

226

18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1)(b) (2003).

227

18 U.S.C. § 1963-4 (2003).

See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, tit. 9, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/110mcrm.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2003) (discussing organized crime and racketeering).
The Department of Justice has noted, “[u]tilization of the RICO statute, more so than most other federal criminal sanctions,
requires particularly careful and reasoned application…. A RICO count which merely duplicates the elements of proof of
traditional Hobbs Act, Travel Act, mail fraud, wire fraud, gambling or controlled substances cases, will not be approved
unless it serves some special RICO purpose.” Id. With respect to Internet gambling, RICO has been primarily used by
private plaintiffs to sue credit card companies that have been associated with Internet gambling operations. Id.
228

See, e.g., In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 475 (E.D. La. 2001) (stating that the court failed to find credit
card companies “directed, guided, conducted, or participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of an enterprise though
a pattern of racketeering activity and/or collection of unlawful debt . . . as defined by RICO”); Jubelirer v. MasterCard Int’l
Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (W.D. Wis. 1999). In Jubelirer, the court stated:
229

[The] Plaintiff has alleged facts which make it apparent that the only relationship between the on-line
casino and the defendants is a routine contractual relationship for the provision of consumer financing.
That relationship does not constitute a RICO enterprise and the performance of such services does not
constitute the operation or management of an enterprise.
Id. at 1052.
230

Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).

231

Goss, supra note 180, ¶ 39.

See generally EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), citing Foley Brothers Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,
285 (1949). “It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears,
is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . .’ We assume that Congress legislates
against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.” Id.
232

See, e.g., U.S. Patriot Act, Title III, § 377, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 342 (2001) (“Grants the United States
extraterritorial jurisdiction where: (1) an offense committed outside the United States involves an access device issued,
owned, managed, or controlled by a financial institution . . . .”) (emphasis added).
233

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084, 1952 to 1955 (2003). However it could be argued that the references to “foreign
commerce” in § 1084(a) and § 1952(a) indicate that Congress intended to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id.; see also
Goss, supra note 180, ¶ 41.
234

235

18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2003).
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See United States v. Ross, 1999 WL 782749, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1999) (asserting jurisdiction over Internet sports
betting operator that was based in Curacao); People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 851 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1999). In World Interactive Gaming Corp., the court notes:
236

[F]or respondents’ claim that none of the federal statutes apply to operation of an Internet casino licensed
by a foreign government, there is nothing in the record or the law to support their contentions. To
the contrary, the Wire Act, Travel Act and Paraphernalia Act all apply despite the fact that the betting
instructions are transmitted from outside the United States over the Internet.
Id. It should be noted that the defendant in World Interactive Gaming was a Delaware corporation and its subsidiary was
Antiguan.
237

United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1945).

238

Id. at 444.

239

Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 797-98 (1993).

Id. at 799 (holding that London reinsurers’ refusal to sell certain types of reinsurance to insurers in the U.S. violated the
Sherman Act, despite the legality of the act under British law). The court then balanced this conflict against a situation in
which there is a direct conflict between U.S. and another nation’s laws. When a foreign law requires a company “to act in
some fashion prohibited by the law of the United States,” the circumstances may justify refraining from exercising subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. Considering, however, that no country’s law requires an Internet casino to offer its services to U.S.
citizens and that verification procedures exist to enable online casinos to exclude the bulk of U.S. clients, it seems unlikely
that Internet casinos could invoke a direct conflict of laws as a defense to subject matter jurisdiction.
240

241

Id. at 797-98.

242

See supra Part III.

See Goss, supra note 180, ¶ 47 (“To the extent that online gaming threatens the viability of a significant industry that
employs large numbers of Americans and generates considerable profits, such gaming has a significant effect in the United
States.”).
243

See id. ¶ 48 (“As people move from traditional to online gaming, there is likely to be a decrease in taxation revenue
generated by gaming unless technology or regulation makes online tax collection possible.”).
244

See id. ¶ 44. Contrary to what is sometimes claimed, prosecuting foreign Internet gaming operators does not amount
to the U.S. imposing its moral views on other countries. If Antiguans want to gamble on Antiguan or other foreign online
gaming sites, then they are free to do so. However, foreign gambling operations whose business is deliberately based on
an American clientele (by using, for example, advertisements targeted to a U.S. audience) should not be viewed as neutral
bystanders who become the unwitting victims of a bullying American policy. In 2001, Antigua had around 100 gaming
online operators, in contrast to the approximately 40 remaining today. See Bradley Vallerius, Antigua Moves Forward with
WTO Claim vs. U.S., INTERACTIVE GAMING NEWS, June 25, 2003 (on file with the Richmond Journal of Law & Technology).
According to Sir Ronald Sanders, an Antiguan foreign affairs representative, “the effect of the United States enforcement
of its laws is to hurt the small economy of Antigua and Barbuda.” Sir Ronald Sanders, Statement to the Dispute Settlement
Body of the World Trade Organization, Geneva, Switzerland (June 24, 2003), available at http://www.antigua-barbuda.com/
busnss_politics/body_sirronaldwto_statement.html. This may suggest that a fair number of these Internet gambling
operators were dependant upon American revenues. As one commentator has noted, “[t]he United States must not allow
individuals to take advantage of advances in communications technology to intentionally violate federal and state laws
simply by moving offshore.” Lynch, supra note 6, at 201.
245

246

See, e.g., People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).

See id. But see United States v. Truesdale, 152 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a Caribbean-based gambling
operation that had the potential to accept bets from Texas residents, although there was no specific evidence that it had, did
not violate Texas’ anti-gambling statutes). In Truesdale, the court stated:
247

Jones and his co-appellants went to great effort to make sure that their operation was legal. They set
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up offshore offices and consulted with lawyers in the United States and abroad on the legality of their
enterprise; they furnished the Caribbean local offices with desks and telephones and staffed them
with personnel to accept international phone wagers; they set up separate phone lines that could be
used to place bets in the offshore offices. Under these circumstances, without specific evidence of
any wrongdoing, it is irrational to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that after having gone through
the effort of fully equipping, staffing, and widely advertising the Caribbean offices, the appellants
nevertheless illegally accepted bets in the United States.
Id. at 448 (emphasis added). Absent specific evidence of an illegal transaction, the mere fact that the Internet gaming site
can be accessed by a jurisdiction’s residents may be insufficient to establish jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Id.
248

World Interactive Gaming, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 847.

249

Id. at 850 (citing N.Y. CLS PENAL § 225(2) (2003)).

250

Id.

251

Id. at 852.

Id. at 851; see also Schwarz, supra note 167, at 1038-39 (noting that often Internet gamblers try to unsuccessfully
argue they are not bound by federal or state laws because they have legally purchased licenses in other countries and have
“physically located” hardware there).
252

253

Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 742 (W.D. Tex. 1998).

254

See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).

255

See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-15 (1984).

256

Id. at 414-16.

See Mellon Bank (E.) PSFS v. Kenneth, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992) (construing Dollar Savings Bank v. First
Securities Bank, 746 F.2d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 1984)).
257

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)); see also
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474-75 (1985).
258

Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)).
259

260

Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316.

261

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977).

262

Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292).

263

Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 114.

Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997); accord Soma Med. Int’l v. Standard
Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296 (10th Cir. 1999); Resnick v. Manfredy, 52 F. Supp. 2d 462, 467-68 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
264

265

Zippo, 952 F. Supp at 1124 (citations omitted).

Am. Homecare Fed’n v. Paragon Scientific Corp., 27 F. Supp.2d 109, 114 (D. Conn. 1998). Courts may be moving
away from Zippo towards a more purely effects-based test. See Geist, supra note 171, at 1371-72. Nevertheless, this
more recent test would not hinder courts from exercising personal jurisdiction over Internet gambling operations given the
numerous effects that such operations may have on a forum. See supra Part III.
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267

State v. Granite Gate Resorts Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715, 720-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
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Id. at 720.

269

Id. at 719 (noting Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)).

270

Id. at 720.

271

Id. at 721.

Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738, 744 (W.D. Tex. 1998); see also People v World Interactive Gaming
Corp., 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 857-58 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (finding personal jurisdiction over a New York-headquartered
company that had established an Antigua-based Internet casino because all of the administrative and executive decisions
were made in New York, advertising had been done nationally and reached thousands of New Yorkers, and the company
had received phone calls from New York residents on a toll-free number).
272

273

Goss, supra note 140, ¶¶ 75-76.

274

714 N.Y.S.2d 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).

275

Id. at 855.

276

Id. at 861.

277

998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998).

278

Id. at 745 (citations omitted).

See, e.g., State by Humphrey v. Granite Gate Resorts, 568 N.W.2d 715, 721 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (“The state has an
interest in enforcing consumer protection statutes and regulating gambling.”); People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp.,
714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 860 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (referring to New York state’s “deep-rooted policy against unauthorized
gambling”).
279

280

Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1216 (1998).

281

H.R. Rep. No. 1549, at 4029 (1970).

For example, the Sixth Circuit has liberally interpreted the Illegal Gambling Act, holding that janitors as well as “runners,
telephone clerks, salesmen, dealers, doormen and watchmen ‘conduct’ gambling businesses within the meaning of the statute.”
282

United States v. Merrell, 701 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1983).

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1084(a), (d) (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 1953(c) (2003); 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a)
(2003); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-1964 (2003).
283

Lynch, supra note 6, at 178. The Wire Act has been used, though, against American citizens living abroad. See, e.g.,
United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing a defendant bookmaker with American citizenship who
resided in the Dominican Republic).
284

Extradition requests are often based on treaties that require that the defendant’s action be a crime in both jurisdictions.
Goldsmith, supra note 280, at 1216-20. This is the case, for example, between the U.S. and the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the
Grenadines). See Extradition Treaty, Oct. 10, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-19, art. 2, available at 1996 WL 913075.
Extradition clearly cannot be relied upon when the defendant’s activity is not only legal in the foreign jurisdiction but
even licensed by the foreign government. The same logic would suggest that the legal theory of comity, “diplomatic
niceties performed by countries out of a sense of international etiquette rather than binding obligation,” would be equally
unsuccessful in securing a foreign defendant. Jay Hall, International Comity and U.S. Federal Common Law, 84 AM. SOC’Y
INT’L L. PROC. 326 (1990).
285

18 U.S.C. § 1304 (derived from former 316 of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1088-89, repealed by 62 Stat.
862, 866); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1211; 47 C.F.R. § 76.213. However, some of this legislation is facing increased scrutiny. See,
286
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e.g., Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (The Supreme Court held that
the FCC could not prevent a Louisiana broadcasting association from airing advertisements for private, offline casinos
in Louisiana, where such gambling was legal, simply because residents in Texas or Arkansas, where private commercial
casino gambling was not legal, might hear the emissions.).
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 157 (1999). Again, please note that the author is referring
to the type of technologies that existed during the enactment of the relevant statutes and up until recently. These
generalizations do not apply, for example, to digital telephone networks or cable modems which follow distributed/random
transmission models. Id. at 44.
287

288

See ROBERT H. REID, ARCHITECTS OF THE WEB: 1,000 DAYS THAT BUILT THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS xx (1997).

289

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODES AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 32 (1999).

290

Id.

291

See ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING
WORLD WE KNOW 16 (1999).

THE
292

LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 44.

293

Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 654 (2003).

However, states have succeeded in pursuing third parties, such as payment providers, that are associated with Internet
gaming operators. These enforcement measures are discussed in Part V(c).
294

S. 1495, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2380, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 474, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 3125, 106th Cong.
(2000); S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 4419, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 5020, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R. 3004, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 556, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2579 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 3215, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 3006,
107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 1223, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 627, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 21, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2143,
108th Cong. (2003).
295

296

141 CONG. REC. S19110-07 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).

297

H.R. 2380, 105th Cong. (1997).

While federal statutes do not, in general, criminally sanction the individual gambler, there are other federal efforts that
seek to dissuade individuals from gambling. See Charles W. Blau, Federal Tax Issues, in FEDERAL GAMBLING LAW 283,
286 (Anthony N. Cabot ed. 1999) (suggesting that the federal income tax regulations on gambling are designed “to punish
the gambler for participating in an immoral activity”). Furthermore, some state statutes, such as those of Louisiana and
Illinois, provide sanctions for Internet gamblers. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:90.3(D)(E)(I)(2003); and Ill. Laws 257.
298

299

18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2003).

300

See United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.R.I. 1981)

It applies to “[w]hoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign
commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (2003).
301

302

United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088 (5th Cir. 1993).

Id. at 1094 (citing McIntosh v. United States, 385 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1967)); see also Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S.
808, 811 (1971) (“[I]t cannot be said, with certainty sufficient to justify a criminal conviction, that Congress intended that
interstate travel by mere customers of a gambling establishment should violate the Travel Act.”).
303

See, e.g., Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239 (1972) (discussing a bookmaking operation that sent scratch
sheets across state lines); United States v. Fabrizio, 385 U.S. 263 (1966) (noting that a defendant sold New Hampshire
sweepstake tickets in New York); United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that defendants sold
a bookmaking computer program across state lines); United States v. Scaglione, 446 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that a
304
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defendant sent in interstate commerce “flash paper” [paper which could be easily burned in the event of a police search] for
use in gambling activities); United States v. Baker, 364 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1966) (noting that defendants shipped tickets for
Haiti-based lottery through the mail).
18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2003); see also United States v. Schullo, 363 F. Supp. 246, 249-50 (D. Minn. 1973) (“Congress’ intent
was to include all those who participate in the operation of a gambling business, regardless of how minor their roles, and
whether they be labeled agents, runners, independent contractor or the like. Only customers of the business were to be
excluded.”).
305

Kelly, supra, note 17, at 142 (citing Letter from L. Anthony Sutin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Patrick
Leahy (May 26, 1998)); see also Hogan, supra, note 161, at 847 n.152 (“Enforcement problems alone may preclude
suits against individuals . . . . [L]aw enforcement agencies would wind up pursuing an inexhaustible supply of small time
bettors, while a hundred or so sites continue to reap the benefits of the millions who cannot be caught.”)
306

307

Blakey & Kurland, supra note 19, at 957.

308

18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2003).

309

See, e.g., H.R. 5020, 106th Cong. (2002); S. 692, 106th Cong. (2002); S. 3006, 107th Cong. (2002).

310

See, e.g., H.R. 5020, 106th Cong. (2002); S. 692, 106th Cong. (2002); S. 3006, 107th Cong. (2002).

311

H.R. 21, 108th Cong. (2003).

Ben Edelman, Web Sites Sharing IP Addresses: Prevalence and Significance, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/
edelman/ip-sharing/ (last updated Sept 12, 2003).
312

313

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980) (citations omitted) (“The

government may ban . . . commercial speech related to illegal activity.”).
314

R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 755, 772-73 (1999).

315

Goldsmith, supra note 280, at 1229-30.

316

See Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

317

Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV.653, 655 (2003).

See, e.g., id at 685 (noting that “China’s destination ISPs began to search data packets for particular sensitive
keywords”).
318

319

18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1)(i) (2003).

18 U.S.C. § 1952(b)(1) (2003). The Travel Act is heavily grounded in state law. The United States Supreme Court has
stated that the Travel Act reflected “a congressional judgment that certain activities of organized crime which were violative
320

of state law had become a national problem. The legislative response was to be commensurate with the scope of the problem.”
United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 292 (1969); see also United States v. Gonzalez, 907 F. Supp. 785, 791 (D. Del. 1995)
(“[The Travel Act] makes it a federal offense for an individual to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to promote or
facilitate the promotion of any activity in violation of the laws of any state.”); United States v. Garramone, 380 F. Supp. 590, 592
(E.D. Pa. 1974). (“The statute defines ‘unlawful activity’ to include a business enterprise involving gambling offenses in violation
of the laws of the state in which they are committed.”). But see United States v. Campagnuolo , 556 F.2d 1209, 1212 (5th Cir.
1977) (stating that the Travel Act made it “a federal offense to use interstate facilities to conduct a gambling operation.”).
321

15 U.S.C. § 1172 (2003).

18 U.S.C. § 1953(b)(2) (2003). However, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has held that the Wagering
Paraphernalia Act prohibits the mailing of lottery tickets from a state in which the lottery is legal to any other state. United
States v. Stuebben, 799 F.2d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 1986).
322
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See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 967 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2633 (“Nothing in the exemption, however,
will permit the transmission of bets and wagers or money by wire as a result of a bet or wager from or to any State whether
betting is legal in that State or not”); United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that the Wire Act
323

“provides a safe harbor for transmissions . . . [when]: (1) [the] betting is legal in both the place of origin and the destination
of the transmission; and (2) the transmission is limited to mere information that assists in the placing of bets, as opposed
to including the bets themselves”); United States v. Ross, No. 98 Cr. 1174-1, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22351, at *6 - *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1999). In Ross, the court noted:
The § 1084(b) exemption by its terms applies only to the transmission of ‘information assisting in
the placing of bets,’ not to the other acts prohibited in § 1084(a), i.e. transmissions of (1) ‘bets or
wagers’ or (2) wire communications entitling the recipient to money or credit as a result of bets or
wagers. With regard to transmissions of “information assisting in the placing of bets,” the exemption is
further narrowed by its requirement that the betting at issue be legal in both jurisdictions in which the
transmission occurs. No exemption applies to the other wire communications proscribed by § 1084(a),
even if the betting at issue is legal in both jurisdictions.
Ross, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22351, at *6 -*7.
324

GAMBLING IN AMERICA, supra note 36, at 5.

325

Martin v. United States, 389 F.2d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).

Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com. on S. 3357 and H.R. 6736, 81st Cong. 37 (1950)
(statement of Herzel H.E. Plaine, Office of the Assistant Solicitor General, Department of Justice).
326

See Malcolm Testimony, supra note 3, available at http://cybercrime.gov/Malcolmtestimony42903.htm (“Traditionally,
gambling has been one of the staple activities in which organized crime has been involved, and many indictments brought
against organized crime members have included gambling charges.”).
327

Compare John Warren Kindt, The Failure to Regulate the Gambling Industry Effectively: Incentives for Perpetual NonCompliance, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 219, 241 (2003) (“Of course, legalized gambling is a catalyst for crime.”) and PENNSYLVANIA
CRIME COMMISSION, RACKETEERING AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE BINGO INDUSTRY (1992) (providing an example of a link
between organized crime and legal gambling) with Mike Roberts, supra note 11, at 593 (“Initial suspicion that Nevada, and
legalized gaming in general, fell under the control of organized crime early on and thereafter remained under such control
is purely speculative . . . . [Furthermore,] there appears to be no recent proof that organized crime, presumably existing
in the form of large hotels and other publicly traded corporations, still infests the legal gaming business.”), and National
Gambling Final Report, supra note 1, at 7-13, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/7.pdf (“[B]eyond
pathological gambling, tracing the relationship between crime and gambling has proven difficult.”).
328

See H.R. REP. No. 967 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2632. See also generally ESTES KEFAUVER, CRIME
52 (1968) (referring to “[t]he fight to keep bookmakers, the scavengers of crime in America, out of business,
and to put a crimp in the pocketbooks of the overlords of the underworld who control them . . . .”).
329

IN AMERICA

330

18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (2003). Section 1084 states:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce
of information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or
foreign country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State or foreign country in
which such betting is legal.

Id.
331

18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (2003).

332

H.R. REP. No. 967 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2631, 2632.

The 1978 Interstate Horseracing Act (which was amended in 2000) allows off-track betting operators in State A to
accept wagers via telephone or other electronic media for bets on tracks in State B provided that State A’s operators obtain
the consent of the appropriate horse racing associations and commissions in State B. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3007 (2000).
Congress viewed the wagering at issue to be economically beneficial for the states. See S. REP. NO. 95-1117, at 4 (1978),
333
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reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4144, 4147 (noting that pari-mutuel “provides substantial revenue to the States through
direct taxation . . . provides employment opportunities for thousands of individuals, and contributes favorably to the balance
of trade”). The rationale for the Act was that “in the limited area of interstate off-track wagering on horseraces, there is
a need for Federal action to ensure States will continue to cooperate with one another in the acceptance of legal interstate
wagers.” 15 U.S.C. § 3001 (2000). The idea seems to be that “[w]hile horseracing is a sport on which one can gamble,
it would be erroneous to assume that pari-mutuel wagering is the same as other forms of gambling.” Internet Gambling
Prohibition Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 3125 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. 59 (2000) (prepared Statement of Stephen Walters, Chairman, Oregon Racing Commission), available at http:
//commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju65222.000/hju65222_0.htm. (last visited Feb 27, 2004). However, the
Department of Justice has recently questioned whether this exception is justified. Id. (statement of Kevin V. DiGregory,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division) (“[W]e do not understand why the parimutuel wagering industry
should be allowed to accept bets from people in their homes when other forms of gambling have rightly been prohibited
from doing so. The same concerns that we have expressed about children and compulsive gamblers having unfettered
access to gambling via the Internet is true whether the betting is on horse races or on casino games.”).
See World Trade Organization, Antigua and Barbuda Request Panel Against U.S. on Gambling and Betting, at
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/dsb_24june03_e.htm (June 24, 2003) (“On 24 June 2003, Antigua and
Barbuda made its first request for the establishment of a panel to look at the United States’ measures affecting the crossborder supply of gambling and betting services.”).
334

Michael Anastasio, The Enforceability of Gambling Debts: Laws, Policies and Causes of Action, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 8
(2001). Professor Joseph Kelly presents a more nuanced version of this claim, writing that “states that have not legalized
casinos retain strict laws forbidding the enforcement of gambling debts, while those that have legalized casinos have slowly
relaxed such prohibitions.” Gaming Law Symposium, supra note 11, at 90.
335

See, e.g., Dunes Hotel & Country Club of Las Vegas v. Mayo, 354 N.Y.S.2d 62 (City Civ. Ct. 1974); Nat’l Recovery
Sys. v. Bryer, 507 A.2d 1226, 1228 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that debts incurred by gamblers to Nevada casinos were
unenforceable under Nevada law).
336

James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Right to Recover Money Lent for Gambling Purposes, 74 A.L.R. 5th 369 (1999).
Nowadays, however, it is possible in Puerto Rico, Nevada and New Jersey to enforce certain legally incurred gambling
debts through court action and to have this judgment honored by another jurisdiction’s courts through the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Gaming Law Symposium, supra note 11, at 97, 114.
337

See, e.g., Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc., 656 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). But see, e.g., Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Kommit,
(stating that “the bank’s alleged and unrefuted deliberate allowance of access to credit from the machine in the gambling
area of the casino is a circumstance from which . . . knowledge [that the borrowed money would be used to gamble], could
(but need not) be inferred”). 577 N.E. 2d 639,642 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
338

339

Anastasio, supra note 335, at 22.

Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 4419 Before House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv.,
107th Cong. (2000) (statement of Gregory A. Baer, Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, Department of the
Treasury), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba65225.000/hba65225_0.HTM. (last visited Feb.
27, 2004).
340

See Kelly, supra note 17, at 163 (describing the arguments put forth by both sides in Providian); see also Providian Nat’l
Bank v. Haines, No. CV9808858 (Cal. Super. Ct.) (filed July 23, 1998) (unpublished opinion).
341

342

Anastasio, supra note 335, at 10.

343

As noted by Jon Patterson,
Providian, one of the largest credit card issuers in the United States . . . banned the use of its credit
or debit cards for Internet gambling . . . . Wells Fargo Bank modified its Visa and MasterCard credit
agreements and completely banned the use of its cards for online gambling . . . . Bank of America has a
policy of denying authorization for any transaction that is identified as an Internet gambling transaction.

Jon Patterson, Internet Gambling and the Banking Industry: An Unsure Bet, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 665, 688-89 (2002).
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344

RICO prohibits certain conduct, including the “collection of unlawful debt.” 18 U.S.C §§ 1962(a), (c) (2003).

In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 497 (E.D. La. 2001) (holding that the plaintiff failed to prove the
elements of a RICO claim thus noting the case did not concern an illegal gambling debt).
345

Jubelirer v. MasterCard Int’l., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (holding that the credit card companies’
relationship with the Internet gaming operator fell short of the requisite participation in the operation or management of an
enterprise).
346

347

As one commentator notes,
It is important to note that parties seeking to bar the enforceability of an Internet gambling debt on
grounds of illegality may need to overcome the consequences of their own conduct. Under the in pari
delicto doctrine, an Internet gambler who engages in Internet gambling that is deemed illegal, may be
barred from asserting, for example, a RICO cause of action due to his or her own involvement in the
illegal activity.

Anastasio, supra note 335, at 63.
348

Id. at 26.

This is the case for credit card associations, such as Visa or MasterCard, which merely establish operating standards
and do not offer credit card services either to cardholders or to merchants. In contrast, full-service credit card companies,
including Discover, provide credit card services to both cardholders and merchants, thereby lessening the number of
intermediaries in the transaction. See GAO Report, supra note 75, at 8-10.
349

350

See generally id. at 10.

This may involve simply misusing the credit card company’s transaction codes (viz. not identifying themselves as
an Internet gambling operator) or illegitimate factoring, where the Internet gambling operator “submits credit card
transactions through another merchant’s terminal using that merchant’s identification number and merchant category code,
and pays that merchant a percentage of the submitted transactions.” See GAO Report, supra note 75, at 22.
351

352

Anastasio, supra note 335, at 31.

Some of these arguments may be undermined by the fact that, due to the riskier nature of Internet gambling charges,
Visa and MasterCard have managed to identify several Internet gaming merchants and to charge them a 7% fee of the
gross revenue charged in contrast to the 2% fee applied to other Internet merchants. Patterson, supra note 344, at 694
n.7. Despite the occasional customer refusing to pay his credit card bill, the credit card companies and banks may have
still reaped a healthy profit. It has been estimated that credit card companies and banks made $112 million from Internet
gambling fees in 2000. Id. at 668.
353

See Press Release, Attorney General Bob Butterworth, Western Union Cuts Off Sports Betting Accounts (Dec. 23,
1997), at http://myfloridalegal.com/852562220065EE67/0/06268A62EB5817BA852565B50046B857?Open&Highlight=2,
Western,Union,Cuts,Off,Sports,Betting,Accounts.
354

See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Agreement Reached with Paypal to Bar
New Yorkers from Online Gambling (Aug. 21, 2002), at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug21a_02.html.
While online gamblers may find it difficult to use PayPal, other third-party online payment providers like NetTeller and
FirePay are stepping in to fill PayPal’s place in the realm of online gambling. See Fred Faust, What’s Up (and Down)
with Internet Gaming Credit Card Transactions!, GAMBLING TIMES MAGAZINE, Winter 2002-2003, available at http://
www.gamblingtimes.com/writers/ffaust/ffaust_winter2002-03.html.
355

Sebastian Sinclair, Some Bumps in the E-Gambling Road, in INTERNET GAMBLING REPORT V 61, 69 (Mark Balestra ed.,
2002).
356

357

National Gambling Final Report, supra note 1, at 5-12, at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/5.pdf.

358

H.R. 2579 I.H., 107th Cong. (2001).
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H.R. 4419 R.H., 106th Cong. (2000); see also S. 627, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 21, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 3004 I.H.,
107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2579 I.H., 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 556 E.H., 107th Cong. (introduced 2001).
359

H.R. 4419 R.H., 106th Cong. (2000); see also S. 627, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 21, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 3004 I.H.,
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